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ABSTRACT 
The collapse of companies worldwide particularly the fall of Enron and WorldCom in the 
United States of America (USA) has led to considerable debate on the need for improved 
corporate governance standards in public companies. The fall of major financial 
institutions in the USA has also led to many corporate governance reforms through the 
promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2000 (SOX), which regulates corporate 
governance at federal level and various corporate governance codes regulating corporate 
governance mostly at state level. SOX, amongst other things, aims to regulate the audit 
process and profession and increase the responsibilities of corporate boards for their 
failure to insure against future malfunction.1In South Africa, the need for improved 
corporate governance has been highlighted in the King I Report of 1994 (King I)2 and the 
King II Report of 2002 (King II). The King II Report emphasises the need to have a good 
of balance of executive and non-executive directors at board level. Furthermore, the King 
II also highlights the importance of having non-executive directors occupy certain 
positions on the board, such as the chairperson of the board and chair the nomination and 
remuneration board committees. Given the above recommendations, this dissertation 
focuses on the role of the independent director within corporate governance.3 This 
dissertation seeks to ascertain the role played by the independent director in light of the 
numerous recommendations from the King II and other corporate governance codes. The 
purpose of this analysis is to highlight the importance and value the independent director 
brings towards maintaining good corporate governance. 
                                            
1
 Justin O‟Brien „The politics of symbolism: Sarbanes –Oxley in Context, Chapter 2‟ in Paul U. Ali and 
Greg N. Gregoriou. -Hoboken, N.J, International Corporate Governance after the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(2006) at 9. 
2 In 1994 the King Report on Corporate Governance was published by the 
King Committee on Corporate Governance, headed by former High Court judge, Mervyn King S.C. The 
King Committee introduced the King I, which incorporated a Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct. 
The King I was the first of its kind in the country in that it aimed to promote the highest standards of 
corporate governance in South Africa. In 2002, the King Committee followed out by releasing the King II. 
Available at http://www.cliffedekker-hofmeyr.com/files/CD_King2.pdf [Accessed 29 August 2009]. 
3
 For the purposes of this dissertation, I shall refer to the non-executive director and independent non-
executive director under the umbrella term independent director. The independent director referred to in 
this work is the director who is currently serving on the board but is not involved in the day-day activities 
of the company and has no material relationship with the company or its affiliates other than as a director. 
The independent director is also not a representative of any shareholder.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The role of the independent director is not clearly defined in most legislation 
around the globe. Hence, a company, through its Articles of Association or 
Memorandum of Incorporation, may attach any role it wishes the director to carry 
out. Most companies seem to entrust the independent director with three roles, 
which are the monitoring of managerial activities, strategy development, and 
ensuring that the company complies with the various companies’ legislation.4 
However, Dixion et al assert that, the independent director has largely emerged, 
amongst other factors, due to the need to monitor managerial activities.5  
 
In carrying out the above roles, the independent director has often been 
described as the cornerstone of good corporate governance in that, the director 
provides an unbiased, independent, varied and experienced perspective to the 
board.6 As such, a variety of corporate governance codes have advocated for 
publicly listed companies to employ effective independent directors.  
 
AIM OF DISSERTATION 
This dissertation seeks to analyse the role of the independent director in 
maintaining good corporate governance. The outcome of the above analysis 
intends to draw attention to the value the independent director brings towards 
maintaining good corporate governance.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
The research for this dissertation will primarily be conducted through analysing 
the various corporate governance codes and legislation that regulate public listed 
companies. The research shall primarily focus on South Africa and other 
countries that share a similar corporate governance system such as Australia, 
                                            
4 Rob Dixion, Keith Milton and Anne Woodhead, An investigation into the role and effectiveness and 
future of non-executive directors, (2005) Vol. 31 No.1 Journal of General Management 1 at 3. 
5 Ibid. 
6
 Madhav Mehra, Are we making a mockery of independent directors? Available at 
http://www.wcfcg.net/ht130304.htm [Accessed 22 June 2009]. 
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United Kingdom and the United States of America. Nonetheless, in order to draw 
comparisons, reference shall also be made to other jurisdictions other than those 
listed above.  
 
STRUCTURE OF DISSERTATION 
Chapter One provides a general background to corporate governance. This is 
done by explaining the various concepts of corporate governance, followed by a 
discussion on the two main models of corporate governance, the shareholder 
model and stakeholder model. The purpose of discussing these two models is to 
put into perspective the approach to corporate governance that has been 
adopted in various jurisdictions. Chapter one also introduces the concept of the 
corporation as a separate legal entity and the effect the concept has on corporate 
governance. In discussing the corporation as a separate legal entity, the 
dissertation touches on the separation between shareholders and management 
(agency theory) and attempts to explain how the agency theory gave rise to the 
independent director. Lastly, the chapter discusses the rationale for the 
independent director in the corporate governance. 
 
Chapter Two introduces the board of directors. This chapter focuses on 
the role of the board and the composition of the board in line with various 
corporate governance recommendations. The recommendations that will be 
discussed include, the splitting of roles between the chairperson and the chief 
executive officer and the need to have a majority of independent directors on the 
board. Having looked at the recommendations on the role and composition of the 
board, this chapter proceeds to discuss the duties of a director and the recent 
codification of some of the fiduciary duties under the new Companies Act7 and 
the purpose of such codification. In comparison to South Africa, a brief 
                                            
7
 Companies Act No 71 of 2008. The new Companies Act No 71 of 2008 was assented to on 9 April 2009. 
The Act comes into operation on a date still to be fixed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette, 
which may not be earlier than one year following the date on which the President assented to this Act.The 
new Companies Act is available at http://www.thedti.gov.za/ccrd/companiesact.pdf [Accessed 12 August 
2009].  
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discussion on the codification of director’s duties in the United Kingdom will also 
be undertaken.8 
 
Chapter Three introduces the concept of the independent director. This 
chapter examines the definition of the independent director as prescribed by 
legislation and corporate governance codes. The chapter begins by discussing 
how the current South African Companies Act9 and new Companies Act10 have 
attempted to define the independent director. The chapter also refers to how 
South African case law and other similar jurisdictions have differentiated between 
an executive director and a non-executive director.   
 
After analysing the above legislation, chapter three undertakes a 
comparative analysis of how various corporate governance codes have defined 
the independent director and the requirements for one to qualify as an 
independent director under these codes. The purpose of this comparative 
analysis is to draw distinction as to how other jurisdictions have defined the 
independent director in response to the call for improved corporate governance. 
The codes that are analysed include the United Kingdom Combined Code, the 
South African King II11 and the New York Stock Exchange Rules. I have chosen 
the above codes to highlight the distinct manner in which each code defines the 
independent director. Furthermore, the above codes emanate from countries that 
share a similar corporate governance system with that of South Africa.   
 
After laying out the platform on what constitutes an independent director, 
chapter three analyses in detail the role of the independent director in corporate 
                                            
8
 I have chosen a comparison with the United Kingdom as it has also codified the duties of a director. 
Moreover, the UK also shares a similar corporate governance framework as that of South Africa. 
9
 Act No 61 of 1973. 
10
 Act No 71 of 2008.  
11
 It is important to note  that The King II operates under the “comply or explain” philosophy, in which a 
listed company is required to specify annually the King II principles with which it has not complied and 
explain the extent of and the reasons for  any material non-compliance. 
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governance. This part of the dissertation adopts a similar approach as above, in 
that it analyses the current Companies Act, the new Companies Act and various 
corporate governance codes and journal articles in an attempt to ascertain how 
the above have defined the role of the independent director. Nonetheless, more 
emphasis will be placed on the corporate governance codes and journal articles, 
as they lay out the role of the independent director clearer than the legislation.  
 
Chapter Four looks at the independent director in action through analysing 
how the director implements his role on various board committees. This chapter 
analyses the independent director’s role on the audit committee, remuneration 
committee and nomination committee. This chapter also looks at whether the 
independent director adds value to the company and the challenges an 
independent director faces in carrying out his functions. This is followed by a 
discussion on ways to make the independent director more effective. The chapter 
concludes by giving a summary of the chapters covered in the dissertation before 
going onto chapter five, which concludes by highlighting the main arguments 
raised in the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
1.1 Defining corporate governance 
The concept of corporate governance has no single accepted definition, as there 
are substantial differences to the definition depending on the jurisdiction being 
considered.12 Different jurisdictions seem to attach various definitions to the 
concept according to the needs of the legal system and the corporate 
governance reforms initiated in that jurisdiction. For example, in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) corporate governance is 
commonly defined as,  
 
The system by which companies are directed and controlled, the 
primary concern being with those who supply finance to companies, 
the shareholders.13  
 
Furthermore, corporate governance has also been defined as a system 
that is, ‘concerned with the structures and processes associated with 
management decision-making and control within organizations.’14 As such, 
corporate governance is primarily concerned with the relationship between the 
owners of the business and those who manage the business on behalf of the 
owners. 
 
The corporate governance system defined above that is primarily 
concerned with shareholder value maximisation is commonly referred to as the 
shareholder model of corporate governance. This model of corporate governance 
sees the corporate objective as being primarily to preserve and maximise 
shareholder investment. Under the shareholder model, the corporation is a 
private rather than a public body defined by a set of relationships between the 
principal and agent.15 In other words, the shareholder model of corporate 
                                            
12
 Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon Corporate Governance and Accountability (2007) at 12. 
13
 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report), 
Paragraph. 2.5. Available at http://www.ecgn.org.html  [Accessed 12 March 2009].  
14
 Wixley and Everingham, Corporate Governance (2002) at 1. 
15
 Richard Smerdon A practical guide to corporate governance (1978) at 7. 
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governance concerns the relationship between the shareholders (principal) and 
the management (agents). 
 
 Another characteristic about the shareholder model is that the control and 
decision-making powers are predominately made by management. The reason 
for this being that, shareowners are too busy and too numerous to undertake the 
responsibility themselves, so they hire salaried executives to manage their 
affairs.16  
 
On the other hand, there seems to be a consensus among other 
jurisdictions that corporate governance concerns ‘supervising management 
performance and ensuring accountability of management to shareholders and 
other stakeholders.’17 In comparison to the definitions found in the UK and USA, 
which are primarily concerned with shareholder value maximisation, the above 
definition is slightly wider as it encompasses the concept of accountability 
towards other stakeholders. 
 
Stakeholders have increasingly become important within the corporate 
governance system. The reason being that, companies have become so large 
that their impact on society is so pervasive to an extent that they need to 
discharge accountability to more sectors of society than their shareholders only.18 
In other words, corporations need to be socially responsible for the areas in 
which they operate.  The model of corporate governance described above is 
commonly referred to as the stakeholder approach to corporate governance. The 
stakeholder approach embraces a wider dimension through encompassing 
issues such as rights of workers and clients, corporate social responsibility and 
sustainable development. 
 
                                            
16
 Richard Smerdon, A practical guide to corporate governance (1978) at 7. 
17
 Wixley and Everingham, Corporate Governance (2002) at 1. 
18
 Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon Corporate Governance and Accountability (2007) at 23. 
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The King I was the first to embrace the stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance through ‘highlighting that corporations do not operate in a vacuum’19 
as, ‘there are links which bring together shareholders and stakeholders into an 
interactive situation.’20 The stakeholder interactive approach seeks to align the 
interests of the corporation with those of society. In support of the stakeholder 
model, the King I also noted that companies could no longer operate in the same 
manner as pre-1994 given the diverse socio, political and cultural platform in the 
new democracy that brought about an array of new labour and employment 
equity laws.21 
 
As an aside, one may argue that the stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance may clash with the common law duties of a director to act in the best 
interest of the company. This clash may emanate from the common law duty 
upon the directors to maximise shareholder value to the exclusion of everyone 
else. In response to the above, King II recommends that, companies should 
make decisions in the best interest of the company, however those decisions 
made by the company should result in the company acting responsibly and 
responsively towards its stakeholders.22  
 
The stakeholder approach has received great popularity in Continental 
Europe. In this part of the world, ‘the central preoccupation of corporate 
governance is the rights of the community.’23 The stakeholder approach as 
applied in Continental Europe encourages corporations to strike a balance 
between their economic goals and the social goals they owe to the community. 
Thus, in Continental Europe, a corporation’s social responsibility, accountability, 
                                            
19
 King M The Corporate Citizen (2006) at 8. 
20
King M The Corporate Citizen (2006) at 8. 
21
 The stakeholder approach allows the companies to consider the view of its employees, and the larger 
society in which the company operates. 
22
 Tshepo Mongalo Convergence of Traditional Corporate Governance and Modern Corporate 
Governance Reforms: Is the King 2 déjà vu for Boards of Directors or is it a set of new principles? Obiter 
(2004) 79 at 79. 
23
 Salacuse, Jeswald Corporate Governance in the New Century (2004), The Company Lawyer Vol.25, 69-
83 at 72. 
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and corporate objectives involve advancing the interests of stakeholders such as 
the employees and the wider community, beyond the traditional category of 
shareholders. For example, some corporations have employee representatives 
on supervisory boards.24 To some extent, the supervisory board is used as a 
vehicle to enforce employee rights. 
 
1.2 Emergence of corporate governance 
It is interesting to note that the practice of corporate governance is not a new 
concept as it has been ‘practiced for as long as there have been corporate 
entities.’25 Corporate governance has been developing over a long period of time 
to meet the needs of the corporations. It has been long since established that 
corporate entities need direction in order to allow them to function whilst 
maintaining a balance of power between the owners of the business 
(shareholders) and those who run the business (management).26 Mongalo 
asserts that, 
Early legislation such as the South African Companies Act of 1924, 
the company’s articles of association and the common law have 
always regulated principles of corporate governance.27  
 
The author also notes that: 
 
It is clear that corporate governance issues such as fiduciary duties 
of directors, requirements for special resolutions, the role of 
shareholders and company meetings have always been provided 
for in terms of both common law and companies’ legislation.28 
 
In reference to the above,  Mongalo  cites an example of a shareholder’s 
right to sue a director for breach of a fiduciary duty through a derivative action 
                                            
24
 For instance in Germany, depending on the size of the company or industry, employees have the tight to 
name board representatives. Available at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/09/study/tn9809201s.htm [Accessed 20 August 2009]. 
25
 Tshepo Mongalo, Convergence of Traditional Corporate Governance and Modern Corporate 
Governance Reforms: Is the King 2 déjà vu for Boards of Directors or is it a set of new principles? Obiter 
2004 79 at 79. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid at 80. 
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provided for by s 266 of the current South African Companies Act.29 A similar 
provision, though wider in application than the current Companies Act, is also 
present under the new Companies Act.30 
 
Furthermore, under various companies’ legislation, the shareholders 
through a special resolution have the power to appoint and remove directors. 
This enables shareholders to influence the board appointment process, which in 
turn means that if a certain director or directors are not performing to the benefit 
of the shareholders that director may be removed.31 
 
Mongalo refers to the above-mentioned type of corporate governance that 
is provided for in terms of the common law, company legislation and Articles of 
Association as the traditional or conventional type of corporate governance. The 
conventional type of governance has legal backing and aggrieved parties may 
seek recourse in a court of law. 
 
On the other hand, the corporate world has also been at the forefront of 
promoting and establishing the various codes of good corporate governance in 
response to corporate governance failures or the need to improve corporate 
governance standards. For instance, the King I Report of South Africa, which 
was introduced in 1994, ‘was instrumental in raising awareness of what 
constitutes good governance, both in private and public sectors.’32 Following the 
King I Report, the King II Report reviewed the developments that had taken place 
in the South African economy and in the global markets since 1994.33 Currently, 
                                            
29
 Act No 61 of 1973. 
30
 Section 165(2) of Companies Act No 71 of 2008. This above section allows shareholders and other 
parties mentioned in s165 (2) to take necessary steps to protect the legal interests of the company. 
31
 Section 210 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 and section 68 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
respectively, provide for the appointment of directors.  
32
 Philip Armstrong, Nick Segal and Ben Davis, Corporate Governance in South Africa in C.A Mallin 
Handbook on International Corporate Governance: Country Analysis at 214. 
33
 Ibid at 215. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
6 
 
there is the Draft King III Report34, which emerged because of the new 
Companies Act35 and changes in international governance trends. 
 
 This new system of corporate governance is known as the ‘self regulating 
regime of corporate governance.’36 Although the code-based system of corporate 
governance lacks legal enforcement, it is underpinned by the philosophy of 
‘comply or explain.’37 That is to say, although the corporate codes are not legally 
enforceable, companies are required to explain their extent of non-compliance.38 
Moreover, in South Africa, certain King II recommendations have been integrated 
into the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE Limited) listing requirements and 
are thus binding on Companies listed on this securities exchange.39 Under the 
JSE listing requirements, listed companies have to comply or explain the extent 
to which they have not complied with the guidelines. 
 
1.3 The purpose of Corporate Governance 
The essential purpose of corporate governance is to protect the external 
providers of capital (shareholders). Without meaningful protection for external 
capital providers, those who control the corporation can use their position for 
inappropriate economic benefits, often at the expense of the long-term 
performance and value of the enterprise.40 As such, all the other purposes of 
corporate governance essentially flow from the need to protect the external 
providers of capital. For instance, where good corporate governance is practised, 
it helps to prevent corporate scandals, fraud and potential civil and criminal 
                                            
34
 Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za/downloads/reports/King%20Report%2025%20Feb%202009.pdf 
[Accessed 19 June 2009]. The Draft King III was released for comment in February 2009. 
35
 Companies Act No 71 of 2008.  
36
 Tshepo Mongalo, Convergence of Traditional Corporate Governance and Modern Corporate 
Governance Reforms: Is the King 2 déjà vu for Boards of Directors or is it a set of new principles? Obiter 
2004 79-90 at 81. 
37
 Ibid at 81. 
38
 The comply or explain philosophy differs significantly from the statutory regime which is underpinned 
by the „comply or else‟ philosophy. That is to say, there are legal sanctions for non-compliance. 
39
 Kathleen van der Linde Title, The personal liability of directors for corporate fault- An Exploration, 
(2008) Vol. 20 No 4 South African Mercantile Law Journal at 441. 
40
 Corporate Governance: A Framework for Implementation. Available at 
http://www.systemiclogic.net/artifacts/PUB/governance/gcgfbooklet.pdf at 4 [Accessed on 12 June 2009]. 
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liability of the organization. Should there be any corporate fraud or loss the 
shareholders suffer financially, hence the need for good corporate governance 
practices to minimise losses to the shareholders.41 
 
Practising good corporate governance is also good for business as it 
enhances the reputation of the corporation through making the business more 
attractive to customers, investors and suppliers.42 Investors are likely to invest in 
a company with a good corporate governance reputation than in one without 
good governance practices.43 A recent survey by management consultants 
McKinsey & Co showed that, 
 
Investors are ready to pay a substantial premium for share in a 
company with good corporate governance, especially in non-
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
economies.44 
   
A good system of corporate governance also influences a country’s 
capacity to attract foreign capital. International investment not only provides 
corporations with expanding sources of resources, but also encourages the 
continuous amalgamation of sound corporate governance practices, which may 
assist the corporations to gain the trust of investors, lessen their capital costs and 
induce more stable financial sources.45 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
principles on Corporate Governance also reflect that: 
                                            
41
 The above risks may be prevented through the monitoring role played by independent directors. Since 
the independent director acts as a watchdog, that director is tasked with ensuring that the company is 
following the relevant laws and corporate guidelines. If companies adhere to the corporate guidelines, there 
is a possibility that corporate fraud may be reduced, thus creating more value for the shareholders. 
42
 Frederick D. Lipman and L Keith Lipman Corporate Governance Best Practices: Strategies for 
Public, Private, and Not-for-Profit Organisations (2006) at 3. 
43
 Salacuse, Jeswald Corporate Governance in the New Century (2004) ,The Company Lawyer at 70  
44
 Why Good Corporate Governance is Crucial to Development available at http://www.oecd.org.html 
[Accessed 12 March 2009].  
45
 Melinda Vaughn and Lori Verstegen Ryan, „Corporate Governance in South Africa: a bellwether for the 
continent?‟ Corporate Governance: An International Review (September 2006) Vol.14 No.5 available at 
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118730475/PDFSTART- [Accessed 12 March 2009]  
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Good corporate governance means more efficient utilisation of 
resources, better access to capital, better and higher quality 
employment opportunities, and a better chance of developing in a 
sustained way efficient domestic or regional capital markets. 
Corporate governance is also important for the effectiveness of 
public institutions; better-governed companies are less likely to 
bribe regulators and judges.46 
 
From the above brief discussion, it is evident that good corporate 
governance is integral to investor financing and sustainability of a business. As 
noted earlier, research has also shown that investors are willing to invest in a 
corporation with good corporate practices as compared to a corporation with bad 
corporate governance practices. Hence, following good corporate governance 
recommendations such as increasing the number of independent directors on the 
board is a signal of good corporate governance, which may persuade investors 
to invest in the company. 
 
1.4 The Corporation as a separate legal entity 
In Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd47, the court noted that, ‘a company has a legal 
existence with rights and liabilities of its own, whatever may have been the ideas 
and schemes of those who brought it into existence.’ In other words, a company 
is a separate legal entity from those who own it. As such, when a wrong is 
committed against a company, the company sues as the plaintiff in the 
proceedings and not the members. Similarly, in Macaura v Northern Assurance 
Co Ltd the court stated that, 
 
The property of a company belongs to it and not to its members. 
Neither a member nor a creditor of a company (unless a secured 
creditor) has an insurable interest in the assets of the company.48 
 
                                            
46
 Available at http://www.oecd.html  [Accessed 12 March 2009].   
47
 (1897) AC 22. 
48
 (1925) AC 619 (H.L) 
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As corporations grew and developed over time, those who owned the 
corporation had to employ management who possessed knowledgeable skills 
and expertise to run the affairs of the corporation. Management was delegated 
the power to make the day-to-day decisions on running the corporation on behalf 
of its shareholders. This delegation of power created a divorce of ownership and 
control49, which in turn led to the agency problem. Under the agency problem, the 
managers of the company are defined as agents and the shareholder as the 
principal.50 In essence, this means that, the principal of the company (owner) 
delegates the daily decision making to the agents who are directors of the 
company.51 
 
 The fundamental challenge that arises from the divorce in ownership and 
control is that the agents may not always act in the best interest of the 
shareholders. For instance, ‘the managers may act in their own interests at the 
expense of the shareholders, thereby reducing the expected gains, not only for 
the shareholders but for society as a whole.’52 Management may also tend to 
focus on projects and company investments that provide short terms profits, for 
instance where the manager’s pay is related to this variable, rather than 
maximising long-term shareholder wealth through investment in projects that are 
long term in nature. Due to the separation of ownership from control, Mongalo 
also asserts that: 
 
Management develops the tendency to act in a self-serving manner 
because they only receive a tiny fraction of profits generated by 
their activities since they rarely own a substantial number of shares 
in such companies. They thus act in their own interest rather than 
endeavour to maximize shareholder value. Moreover, to the extent 
that top executives pursue their own agenda rather than seeking to 
improve the profitability of the company, they impose what can be 
referred to as ‘agency costs’ on investors.53 
                                            
49
 Jill Solomon Corporate Governance and Accountability (2000) at 17. 
50 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 J.E Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (1993) at 52. 
53
 Tshepo Mongalo, „The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a Fundamental Research Topic in South 
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Overcoming the separation of ownership and control is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, a growing number of shareholders focus little on their 
investments so long as there are satisfactory dividends from their investments. 
This shareholder passiveness has allowed directors and managers to engage in 
activities that are detrimental to the company. Secondly, shareholders lack the 
necessary time, money, and experience to make full use of their rights, and in 
many cases shareholders are too numerous or too widely dispersed to be able to 
organize themselves effectively monitor management.54 Finally, due to a 
dispersed share ownership structure, no single shareholder owns enough stock 
to affect corporate decision-making resulting in the firm effectively been 
controlled by its managers. 
 
The question that now arises, despite the challenges associated with the 
overcoming the divorce in ownership, is how are shareholders to exercise control 
over management? Various governance mechanisms have been advocated for 
to control managerial power. These include, monitoring by financial institutions, 
prudent market competition, developing an effective and independent board of 
directors, markets for corporate control, concentrated holdings and executive 
compensation.55 Solomon also asserts that, in order to control management there 
is need for an alignment of interests between the managers and the 
shareholders. To achieve this alignment,  shareholders ‘as owners of the 
company have the right to influence the manner in which a company is run 
through voting on director appointments at the Annual General Meeting.’56The 
Annual General Meeting is a good platform to appoint directors who share the 
same interests with the shareholders. In the same vein, the Annual General 
                                                                                                                                  
Africa‟ (2003) Vol. 120 Issue 1 South African Law Journal 173-191 at 178 
54
 Company Law Amendment Committee, CMD 6059 (1945) paragraph 7e. 
55
 Livia Bonazzi and Sardar M.N. Islam, „Agency theory and corporate governance: A study of the 
effectiveness of board in their monitoring of the CEO‟ (2007) Vol. 2 No. 1, Journal of Modelling in 
Management 7 at 7-8. Available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1746-5664.html   [Accessed 12 June 
2009]. 
56
 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2000) at 19. 
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Meeting may also be used to elect independent directors to assist in the 
alignment of shareholder and managerial interests. 
 
In order to facilitate the alignment of managerial and shareholder interests, 
the King II also recommends that corporate boards be comprised of a majority of 
independent non-executive directors who are independent of management so as 
to be able to protect the interests of shareowners.57 Similarly, the UK Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance recommends that the board should be 
composed of a good balance of non-executive directors, preferably independent 
non-executive directors, to avoid any individuals or group of individuals from 
dominating the board processes.58 The Australian Stock Exchange Principles 
also recommend that the majority of the board be composed of independent 
directors.59 Given the various recommendations on how the independent director 
may assist in the alignment of shareholder and managerial interests, it is 
necessary to discuss in detail the rationale of the independent director on 
corporate boards. 
 
1.5 Why the Independent Director? 
As stated earlier, the need for the independent director emerged because of the 
challenges associated with the agency problem i.e. the separation of ownership 
and control. These challenges compelled shareholders to appoint independent 
directors to act as a third eye to watch over the activities of management and 
ensure that management acts in the best interests of the shareholders.  
 
In carrying out this monitoring role60, an independent director assists in 
reducing conflicts of interest between the shareholders and the company 
                                            
57
 King II Report paragraph 2.2.1 at 24. Available at http://www.idosa.co.za [Accessed 15 June 2009]. 
58
 The United Kingdom Combined Code on Corporate Governance  Paragraph A3 
59
 Australian Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (Principles), 
Principles Box 2.1 at 20. Available at 
http://www.shareholder.com/shared/dynamicdoc/ASX/364/ASXRecommendations.pdf [Accessed 25 June 
2009]. 
60
 The monitoring role of the independent director will be discussed in detail under chapter 3. 
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management through bringing an independent voice to the boardroom.61 Langley 
J in Equitable Life Assurance Society v Bowley62 also noted that, a company 
might reasonably look to a non-executive director’s independence of judgement 
in the supervision of the executive management and in conflict resolution. 
Furthermore, the Cadbury Committee noted that due to their independence from 
executive responsibility, independent directors are able to assist in reviewing the 
performance of board executives and take the lead where potential conflicts of 
interest arise. For instance, independent non-executive directors are well placed 
to resolve conflicts emanating from takeovers, boardroom succession, or 
directors’ pay, as their interests are less directly affected.63 In the same vein, the 
King II also recommends that South African boards increase their proportion of 
truly independent directors, as independent directors are more likely than inside 
directors to be free from conflicts of interest and better able to protect 
shareholder interests. 64 
  
The independent director also assists in protecting small shareholders 
against large shareholders, who use their voting power to select directors and 
managers who will do their bidding at the expense of the powerless minority.65 
Although such independent directors face the risk of been ostracised by the large 
shareholders or executive directors, those particular independent directors may 
‘provide a degree of protection to minority shareholders by publicising, or 
threatening to publicise, majority shareholder’s abuses of which the independent 
director became aware.’66 
 
                                            
61
 Jill Solomon Corporate Governance and Accountability (2000) at 69. 
62
 [2003] EWHC 2263, at [41] case cited in Len Sealy and Sarah Worthington Cases and materials in 
Company Law (2007) at 245 
63
Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Cadbury Report), Para. 2.5, 
available at http://www.ecgn.org.html [Accessed 10 April 2009]. 
64
 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa Executive Summary of the King II of 2002 at 22-23. Available at 
http://www.iodsa.co.za  
65
 Donald C. Clarke „Three concepts of the Independent Director‟ (2007) Vol. 32 No 2 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 73 at 80. 
66
 Ibid. 
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However, concerning the above, Clarke asserts that,  
Given corporate law is generally designed to give the largest 
shareholders the largest voice in choosing directors, it is difficult to 
see how directors representing minority shareholders could be 
elected to the board in the first place unless the basic principles of 
director selection were changed.67  
 
Clarke also asserts that, cumulative voting is a possible solution to protect 
minority shareholders, but this system will elect directors representing at best a 
concentrated minority, not a dispersed minority, and even such directors will be 
in a minority on the board and can always be outvoted.68 
 
The independent director is also important in that the director assists in 
certifying that the company has complied with the required standards. For 
instance, in terms of the new Companies Act69 the audit committee, which is 
mostly composed of independent directors, is tasked with preparing reports to be 
submitted to the board as part of the annual financial statements.70 The report 
submitted by the audit committee must amongst other issues comment on the 
financial statements, the accounting practices and the internal financial control of 
the company.71 The independent director as well assists in certifying that the 
annual report is accurate, or that the balance sheets have been prepared in 
accordance with the proper accounting standards72 through giving an 
independent view as an outsider. 
  
In addition, an independent director is seen as an important guarantee of 
integrity and accountability of companies. It is assumed that the interests of those 
who invest in the company will be safe guarded by the presence of independent 
directors who can exercise independent judgement. In addition to the above, 
                                            
67
 Ibid 73. 
68
 Ibid  
69
 Act No 71 of 2008. 
70
 Section 94 (7) (f) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
71
 Ibid 
72
 Donald C. Clarke, Three concepts of the Independent Director, (2007) Vol. 32, No 1 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law, 73 at  83 
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independent directors often see risks and opportunities overlooked by the 
company executives who are typically immersed in the day-to-day running of the 
business.73 
 
Emerging from what has been discussed above, we note that the main 
reasons for having independent directors are that they aid in conflict resolution 
and bring an independent view to matters before the board. Most importantly, we 
observe that independent directors primarily act as watchdogs over 
management. Having discussed the rationale for the independent director, the 
next chapter discusses the board of directors and the role of the board in 
corporate governance.  
 
 
 
  
                                            
73
 Christopher Pass, Corporate Governance and the role of non-executive directors in large UK companies: 
an empirical study. (2004) Vol. 4. No2 Corporate Governance 52 at 55. Available at http://www.emerald-
library.com [Accessed 12 April 2009].  
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CHAPTER 2: THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS  
2.1 The Board of Directors 
The composition of the board of directors is one aspect of corporate governance 
that has brought about a lot of debate. Ideally ,for a board to work effectively, the 
interaction that takes place at board meetings should ensure rational, objective 
and independent decision making in the best interest of the enterprise.’74 In other 
words, an essential ingredient for an effective board is the ability to make 
decisions in an environment that facilitates an independent decision-making 
process.  
 
 A number of corporate governance guidelines have suggested 
recommendations that attempt to make a board more independent and effective. 
One such recommendation, which is discussed below, is that, ‘the board should 
comprise a balance of executive and non-executive directors, preferably with a 
majority of non-executive directors.’75  
 
2.2 Composition of the board 
South Africa has largely adopted a unitary board structure, which brings together 
executive and non-executive board members. The King II recommends that the 
board be composed of a good balance of executive and non-executive directors, 
with preferably a majority of non-executive directors, whom are independent of 
management.76 The UK corporate governance system, which also has a unitary 
board structure, provides that the board should include a balance of executive 
and non-executive directors and in particular independent non-executive 
directors such that no individual or small group of individuals can dominate the 
decision-making process of the board.77The UK Combined Code further provides 
                                            
74
 Wixley and Everingham, Corporate Governance (2002) at 19. 
75
 King II, paragraph 2.2.1. Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za [Accessed 19 June 2009]. 
76
 Ibid. 
77 The United Kingdom‟s Combined Code provision A.3. Available at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined%20Code%20June%202006.pdf [Assessed 
14 June 2009]. 
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that, except for smaller companies, at least half the board, excluding the 
chairperson, should comprise non-executive directors determined by the board to 
be independent. The UK Combined Code also states that a smaller company 
should have at least two non-executive directors.78  
 
The Cadbury Report of the United Kingdom also recommended that the 
board should include a minimum of three non-executive directors who are able to 
influence board decision. The non-executive directors should be able to provide 
an independent view on the corporate strategy, performance, resources, 
appointments and standards of conduct. To ensure independence of the non-
executive directors the report also recommended that the fees payable to non-
executives should take into account the value of contribution made by the non-
executive directors. In addition, the fees payable to these directors should not 
compromise their independence.79  In order to ensure the independence of non-
executive directors, the report also encourages the directors not to take part in 
share option schemes as this could compromise their independence.80 
 
Undoubtedly, should non-executives take part in share option schemes, 
the directors may fall into the same trap as the executives of maintaining  a high 
share price, as this has a direct bearing on their remuneration, instead of 
focusing on the long-term goal of developing the company and creating value for 
present and future shareholders.81 The above practise is referred to as short 
termism. Short termism is a ‘tendency to foreshorten the time horizon applied to 
investment decisions, or raise the discount rate above that appropriate to the 
firm’s opportunity cost of capital.’82 
                                            
78 The United Kingdom‟s Combined Code provision A.3.2. Available at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined%20Code%20June%202006.pdf [Assessed 
14 June 2009]. 
79
 Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2000) at 69. 
80
 Ibid at 70. 
81
 The United Kingdom corporate governance system commonly refers the preoccupation by executives of 
maintaining a high share price as short-termism.  
82
 Note 78 at 17. 
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As an aside, the adoption of the unitary board system has been described 
as a major drawback of the King II.83 The reason being that, the King II 
recommends the unitary board system, ‘but equally tasks boards with meeting 
demanding stakeholder requirements’. The Continental European stakeholder 
model of corporate governance more easily accommodates these stakeholder 
requirements, such as HIV sensitivity and the promotion of Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE).84 As shall be discussed below, under the European 
stakeholder model (two tier board system), ‘business and organisational issues 
are the remit of the executive board and broader economic, stakeholder and 
societal concerns fall under the umbrella of the supervisory board.’85  
 
The unitary board system differs significantly from the European 
Continental system that has a two-tier board system, which separates the 
supervisory function and the management function into different bodies. The two-
tier system characteristically has a supervisory board composed of non-executive 
board members and a management board composed entirely of executives.86 For 
example, the supervisory board could be comprised of ‘50 per cent of 
shareholder elected representatives and 50 per cent of individuals elected by the 
employees.’87  
 
The CEO heads the management board, which focuses on operational 
issues of major importance. The supervisory board on the other hand deals with 
strategic decisions, oversees the management board and does not take part in 
daily corporate decision-making. The supervisory board is an important internal 
‘control mechanism for shareholders as it has the authority to nominate, reward 
                                            
83
 Andrew Kakabadse and Nada Korac-Kakabadse, Corporate governance in South Africa: Evaluation of 
the King II Report (Draft), Journal of Change Management, (2002) Vol. 2, Issue 4, 305–316 at 312. 
84
 Ibid. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
Using the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance: A Boardroom perspective, at 58.  Available at 
http://www.oecd.org.html [Accessed 31
st
 March 2009].  
87
 Tshepo Mongalo, Corporate Law & Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings 
in South Africa, (2003) at 156. 
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and remove executive directors from office and to ratify audit reports, capital 
investments and other key corporate decisions.’88 This type of board structure 
has gained popularity in Continental Europe, as Continental Europe has often 
advocated a stakeholder approach to corporate governance as it provides for 
greater stakeholder inclusiveness than unitary boards. 
 
2.2.1 Board Committees  
Companies set up board committees to assist the board to carry out its functions. 
In South Africa, the current Companies Act89 and new Companies Act90 make it 
mandatory for publicly listed companies to have an audit committee. The new 
Companies Act, in addition to the mandatory requirement of an audit committee, 
allows companies to form any number of committees of directors to meet the 
company’s demands.91 The King II also recommends the formation of board 
committees to which the board may delegate its functions without abdicating its 
own duties. However, the delegation of board functions to board committees in 
no way satisfies or constitutes compliance by a director to the duties owed to the 
company.92  
 
Under the King II, each board should have an ‘audit and remuneration 
committee and that industry and company specific issues should dictate the 
requirement for other committees.’93 Therefore, depending on the size and 
complexity of the company, more board committees may be required. The King II 
also recommends that an independent non-executive director chair the various 
board committees.94 The above recommendation ensures that the interests of the 
                                            
88
 Bezemer, Pieter-Jan Maassen, Gregory F.Van den Bosch, Frans A. J. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review; (2007), Vol. 15 Issue 6 at 1116. Available at http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost.html 
[Accessed on 30 March 2009].
 
89
 Section 269A of Act No 61 of 1973. 
90
 Section 94 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
91
 Section 72 (1) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
92
 Section 72 (3) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
93
 King II of 2002 paragraph 2.7.5 available at http://www.iodsa.co.za.html [Accessed 30 March 2009]. 
94
 Both reports also recommend that the committees consist of majority independent directors.  
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shareholders and other stakeholders are properly considered.95 Furthermore, it 
limits the executive involvement in issues such as remuneration and nomination 
of directors.  
 
2.2.2 Appointment of Directors 
In South Africa, shareholders appoint directors in terms of the Companies Act.96 
The King II recommends that procedures for appointment should be formal, 
transparent, and be assisted where appropriate by a nomination committee 
constituted of non-executive directors only.97 Similarly, the UK Combined Code 
provides for a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure for the appointment of 
new directors to the board.98 The UK Combined Code further provides that, 
appointments to the board should be made on merit and based on an objective 
criterion. The UK Combined Code importantly provides that, ‘care should be 
taken to ensure that appointees have enough time available to devote to the 
job.’99 The above provision aims to limit directors from taking on numerous 
appointments, which may lead to inadequate attention being given to the boards 
they currently serve. 
  
 When selecting individuals for appointment to the board, it is imperative 
that the nomination committee pick the right individuals to enable the board to 
function effectively. Therefore, the nomination committee should not only 
nominate directors for their ability to challenge management. Rather, for 
example, an independent director should be appointed for his business and 
personal ability to add symbolic lustre to a company’s board.100 That is to say, 
                                            
95
 Ramani Naidoo, Corporate Governance An essential guide for South Africa Companies (2002) at 55. 
96
 Section 210 of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973 and section 68 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008 
respectively provide for the appointment of directors. 
97
 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa Executive Summary of the King II of 2002 paragraph 2.2.2 
available at http://www.iodsa.co.za.html [Accessed 30 March 2009]. 
98
The UK Combined Code, paragraph A.4. Available at 
http://www.frc.org.uk/documents/pagemanager/frc/Combined%20Code%20June%202006.pdf [Assessed 
14 June 2009 
99
Ibid. 
100
 Note 95 at 55. 
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when selecting board members, companies must have a list of core 
competencies (skills, knowledge and experience) they require from the director. 
Equally important are the person’s attitude, values, sensitivity to the corporation’s 
issues, ability to work as a team member, accessibility and willingness to devote 
time to the corporation’s needs.101 Board members should also be people of 
integrity who are willing and able to make the right decisions. In other words, 
board members should be able to make independent decisions without undue 
influence from any shareholder or from anyone outside the board. One of the 
failures of Enron Corporation was that, the board of directors was composed of 
directors who were of poor moral character and willing to conduct fraudulent 
activity.102 This led to the non-executive directors in Enron’s audit committee 
failing to police their auditors due to serious conflicts of interest involving 
members of the audit committee.103 
 
2.3 Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer 
Numerous corporate governance guidelines recommend the separation of the 
position of chairperson and CEO. The fundamental reason for the separation is 
to demonstrate the independent role of the chairperson. Hence, the chairperson 
should ideally be an independent director. The chairperson’s role should not be 
one of dominating the board, but one of seeking to achieve maximum 
participation from the board members through providing the board with 
leadership.104 The Chairperson of the board plays a central role in ensuring the 
proper functioning of the board as, 
 
He acts as an important channel of communication between the 
board and management of the company, it is his duty to ensure that 
the board is properly briefed on the issues arising at board 
                                            
101
 Vijay Padaki and Manjulika Vaz, Management Development in Non-Profit Organisations: A 
programme for Governing Boards, (2005) at 159. 
102
 Solomon and Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability 2nd ed (2007) at 41. 
103
 Ibid. This point shall be elaborated further in the chapter that looks at the role of the independent 
director on board committees. 
104
 Tom Wixley and Geoff Everingham, Corporate Governance 2
nd
 ed (2005) at 48. 
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meetings so that directors are able to ask the right questions and to 
make informed decision.105 
 
 The chairperson has more of a demanding role than other independent 
directors do, as the company requires the chairperson have a close 
understanding of operational and strategic issues in order to run the board 
effectively.106 Hence, the company often promotes the chairperson is from within 
the ranks (i.e. the CEO becomes the chairperson) due to his in-depth knowledge 
of the operations of the company. On the other hand, the CEO is responsible for 
the strategic operational performance of the enterprise. That is to say, the CEO is 
responsible for the day-to-day management of the company. 
 
Another rationale for separating the two roles is to prevent a CEO with a 
domineering personality from imposing his or her will on the board by assuming 
the role of the chairperson as well. For instance, some board members may be 
reluctant to support strategies and policies that are contrary to the interests of 
corporate management for fear of incurring the disapproval of their leader.107 The 
separation also aims to ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no 
one individual has unfettered powers of decision-making.108 Moreover, the 
separation attempts to reduce the agency problems through fostering more 
independent decision-making.109 Wang & Dewhirst also assert that separating the 
positions of the CEO and chairperson disperses power and authority, thus 
                                            
105
 Ramani Naidoo Corporate governance: An Essential Guide for South African Companies (2002) at 62. 
106
 Kevin Keasey and Robert Hudson, Non-executive directors and the Higgs Consultation Paper, „Review 
of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors.‟  (2002) Vol. 10 No 4 Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance 361 at 362. Available at http://www.emeraldinsight.com. [Accessed 5 April 
2009]. 
107
 Carol-Anne Ho, S. Mitchell Williams, International comparative analysis of the association between 
board structure and the efficiency of value added by a firm from its physical capital and intellectual capital 
resources, (2003)  Vol. 38 The International Journal of Accounting 465–491 at 474. 
108
 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa Executive Summary of the King II of 2002 at paragraph 2.3.1 
available at http://www.iodsa.co.za [Accessed 14 June 2009]. 
109
 Donaldson, L and Davis J.H (1994) „Boards and company performance- Research challenges the 
conventional wisdom‟ Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2 (3) July 151-160. Quoted from 
Jill Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2002) at 68. 
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enhancing the board’s ability to implement efficiently decisions addressing the 
welfare of a more diverse set of stakeholders.110 
 
Separating the two roles also helps to reduce possible conflict of interest. 
For example, under the CEO duality system the CEO/chairperson is responsible 
for running the board meetings, setting agendas and overseeing the processes of 
hiring, firing and compensating top management, including the CEO. The 
CEO/chairperson is also in a position of self-evaluation, of which it is 
unreasonable to think that the CEO/chairperson can and will make such an 
evaluation objectively.111 
 
Furthermore, ‘a company with good corporate governance structure such 
as split roles… is likely to display more effective monitoring of management’112 as 
compared to a company without the split of roles. The above may be attributed to 
the ability of the chairperson’s position to render an outsider’s perspective on the 
performance of management. In complementing the King II, the Johannesburg 
Securities Exchange (JSE) listing requirements make the separation of the roles 
of the chairperson and the CEO mandatory for companies listed with the JSE. 
However, where the two roles are combined this needs to be justified each year 
in the company’s annual report.113 
 
 
 
                                            
110
 Wang, J., & Dewhirst, H. D, Boards of directors and stakeholder orientation. . (1992). Vol. 11 No 2 
Journal of Business Ethics 115-121. Quoted in Carol-Anne Ho, S. Mitchell Williams, International 
comparative analysis of the association between board structure and the efficiency of value added by a firm 
from its physical capital and intellectual capital resources, (2003) Vol. 38 The International Journal of 
Accounting 465–491 at 475. 
111 Steven T. Petra, Do outside independent directors strengthen corporate boards? (2005) Vol. 5 Issue No 
1 Corporate Governance at 57. 
112
 Tshepo Mongalo, Convergence of Traditional Corporate Governance and Modern Corporate 
Governance Reforms: Is the King 2 déjà vu for Boards of Directors or is it a set of new principles? Obiter 
2004 at  68 
113
 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa Executive Summary of the King II of 2002 paragraphs 2.3.4 
available at http://www.iodsa.co.zahtml [Accessed 30 March 2009].   
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2.4 The role of the board of directors 
The statutory role of the board is to manage the business affairs of the company 
and perform any acts that are provided for by the Memorandum of Incorporation 
and company legislation.114 In other words, apart from issues requiring 
shareholder approval, the board is the ultimate corporate authority. As such, the 
board is generally responsible for strategic planning which aims to foster the 
company’s vision. The King II describes the board as the focal point of the 
corporate governance system and is ultimately accountable and responsible for 
the performance and affairs of the company.115 The King II summarises the role 
of the board as follows: 
 
The board should be able to exercise objective judgment on the 
corporate affairs of the company, independent of management but 
with sufficient management information to enable a proper and 
objective assessment to be made by the directors collectively. The 
board should guide and set the pace of the company’s current 
operations and further development and in so doing should 
regularly review the present and future strengths, weaknesses and 
opportunities of, and threats to the company.116 
 
In pursuant to the above, the OECD principles on corporate governance 
also recommend that the board exercise an objective and independent 
judgement in carrying out the activities of the company.117 Here, the independent 
director is essential as the director brings a different voice and viewpoint from the 
executive directors who transact with the company on a regular basis. In carrying 
out its corporate governance role, the board ultimately has four functions, which 
are discussed below. 
 
                                            
114
 Section 66 (1) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
115
 Institute of Directors in Southern Africa Executive Summary of the King II of 2002. Available at 
http://www.iodsa.co.za [Accessed 14 June 2009]. 
116
 King II at paragraph 15. 
117
 OECD, Principles on Corporate Governance at 58. Available at http://www.oecd.org.html [Accessed 30 
March 2009].   
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2.4.1 Management, Board Selection and Succession 
Apart from selecting the CEO and the principal management, the board is also 
tasked with replacing the CEO and management that have failed to discharge 
their responsibilities whether for business performance or unlawful and ethical 
behaviour. As such, the board is responsible for adopting control mechanisms to 
ensure that management’s behaviour and actions are consistent with the 
interests of the owners. These important control mechanisms include, as noted 
above, the selection, evaluation and if necessary removal of a poorly performing 
CEO and top management. It also includes the determination of managerial 
incentives and the monitoring and assessment of organisational performance.118 
  
2.4.2 Corporate Actions and Decisions  
This role involves the continual checking of corporate financial results and 
prospects, including cash flow, profit and loss by major business segments. 
Under this role, the board focuses on assuring shareholders that, there is prior 
board consideration of any major commitment of corporate resources over a 
period of time.119 „Normally these corporate resource allocation decisions will be 
embodied in corporate strategic plans and board consideration of such plans 
should be an integral part of the strategic planning process.’120 This role also 
includes advising the CEO on strategic plans for the company and the 
surveillance of management to ensure that shareholders receive the full value of 
their investments. 
 
                                            
118
 The Department of Trade and Industry and  Kings College London, “Key Drivers of „Good‟ Corporate 
Governance and the Appropriateness of UK Policy Responses” at 16 available at www.dti.gov.uk/bbf/corp-
gov-research/page15049.html [Accessed 1 April 2009] 
119
 The Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the 
Large Publicly Owned Corporation, The Business Lawyer, July (1977-78)-Vol. 33 at 2099. Available at 
http://www.heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/busl33&id=2159&collection=journals&index=
journals/busl [Accessed 2 July 2009]. 
120
 Ibid. 
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2.4.3 Corporate Social Responsibility 
Another major board responsibility is the consideration of significant social 
impacts of corporate activities and relatedly the consideration of views of 
substantial groups (other than shareowners) significantly affected by such 
corporate activities.121 As companies have developed over time, it is necessary 
that the board consider other interests besides those of the shareholders. 
Although the board is primarily responsible for steering the company to the 
benefit of its owners, such benefits cannot be conceived solely in terms of short-
range profit maximization.122 As companies have become so large to the extent 
that they influence the environment in which they operate, the owners of the 
companies have to balance short-range and long-term profitability. This may be 
done through considering the political and social viability of the enterprise over 
time and in adjusting to the global environment in which it operates.123 As such, in 
carrying out its corporate social responsibility role, the board has to consider the 
overall impact of the activities of the corporation on (1) the society of which it is a 
part, and on (2) the interests and views of groups other than those immediately 
identified with the corporation.124 
 
2.4.4 Compliance with the law 
The board is also responsible for overseeing systems designed to ensure that 
the corporation obeys applicable laws, including tax, competition, labour, 
environmental, equal opportunity and health and safety laws.125 The compliance 
role also involves formulating policies and procedures that promote compliance 
on a sustained and systematic basis by all levels of operating management. 
Here, the independent director is essential in ensuring the conformance and 
performance aspects of the board.  
                                            
121
 Ibid. 
122
 Ibid. 
123
 Ibid. 
124
 The Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the 
Large Publicly Owned Corporation, July (1977-78) Vol. 33 The Business Lawyer at 2100. 
125
 OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance for State-Owned Enterprises at 58. Available at 
http://www.oecd.org/documents [Accessed 30 March 2009].   
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In essence, the major tasks of the unitary board are to manage the 
business collectively for the benefit of shareholders, stakeholders and to comply 
with the financial reporting and other disclosure requirements as laid down by the 
company law.126 In carrying out its mandate, the board of directors is not only 
accountable to the company’s shareholders, but also has a duty to act in their 
best interests. Every director of a company has a duty to act in good faith when 
acting on behalf of the company.127 The above duties of a director are found 
under the common law and some have been codified under the new Companies 
Act.  
 
2.5 Duties of a director 
In South Africa, the core duties of a director are found in the common law and 
legislation. For instance, the current Companies Act obligates directors, to 
disclose any interests in company contracts.128The aim behind the above 
restrictions is to ‘prevent directors of a company from acting in their own interest 
and against the interests of shareholders by burdening the company with 
obligations, not for its benefit, but for the director’s benefit.’129  
 
As the current South African Companies Act130did not clearly spell out the 
rules regarding corporate governance duties and liabilities of directors, these 
matters were largely left to the common law and to the codes of corporate 
practice, i.e. the King II.131 In terms of the South African law and the King II, the 
predominant notion underlying each fiduciary relationship is loyalty.132 
                                            
126
 Pye and Camn, Non –Executive Directors: Moving beyond the „One-size-fits-all‟ View, (2003) Vol. 28 
Issue No.3 Journal of General Management at 57. 
127
 Tshepo Mongalo, Corporate Law & Corporate Governance: A Global Picture of Business Undertakings 
in South Africa, (2003) at 160. 
128
 For instance, section 243 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
129
 M.S. Blackman, R.D. Jooste, G.K. Everingham, Commentary on the Companies Act, (2002) Vol. 2 from 
306-307. 
130
 Act 61 of 1973. 
131
  D. Davis et al Companies and other Business Structures in South Africa Oxford University Press 
Southern Africa , 2009 at  102 
132
  Mongalo, Tshepo, Corporate law and corporate governance: a global picture of business undertakings 
in South Africa, (2003) at 161. 
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In terms of the common law, every director133 of a company has the 
following fiduciary duties:  
 
The duty to act in the best interests of the company, to avoid 
conflicts, to not take corporate opportunities or secret profits, to not 
fetter their votes and to use their powers for the purpose not 
conferred and not for a collateral purpose.134 
 
 A director is also subject to the duty of care, skill and diligence in the 
performance of his duties. The above duty is not a fiduciary duty, but it is an 
additional duty attached to directorship. The King III notes that: 
 
Directors must manage the business of the company as a 
reasonably prudent person would manage his own affairs. The 
standard of care is a mixed objective and subjective test, in the 
sense that the minimum standard is that of a reasonably prudent 
person but a director who has greater skills, knowledge or 
experience than the reasonable person must give to the company 
the benefit of those greater skills, knowledge and experience.135 
 
 
Davis et al136 argue that, directors need to know their duties and must be 
aware of what is expected of them, because the standards of directors’ conduct 
can influence the profitability, determine the extent of foreign and domestic 
investments, and ultimately determine the success of a company. 
 
At times, an independent director is often appointed to represent special 
interests on the board, for instance major shareholders. However, in terms of the 
common law such a director is bound to act in the best interests of all 
shareholders. In other words, the board is collectively responsible to all 
                                            
133
 As shall be discussed later in the dissertation the duty applies to all directors irrespective of whether one 
is an executive director or non-executive director.  
134
 King III at 12. Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za. 
135
 King III. Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za. 
136
 D. Davies et al Companies and other business structures in South Africa, (2009) at 102.  
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shareholders and not to any particular shareholder or constituency body. The 
above principle was noted in the case of Fisheries Development Corporation of 
SA Ltd v. Jorgensen137. In the above case, the court noted that, 
 
A director is in that capacity not the servant or agent of the 
shareholder who votes for or otherwise procures his appointment to 
the board…’138The court went further to note that, ‘the director’s 
duty is to observe the utmost good faith towards the company, and 
in discharging that duty he is required to exercise an independent 
judgment and to take decisions according to the best interests of 
the company as his principal.’139 In addition to the above the 
director, ‘may in fact be representing the interests of the person 
who nominated him,... but, in carrying out his duties and functions 
as a director, he is in law obliged to serve the interests of the 
company to the exclusion of the interests of any such nominator, 
employer or principal.’140 
 
 
Essentially, when an independent director carries out his duties, he is 
expected to do this in a manner that represents and protects all shareholders' 
interests on the board.141 That is to say, the independent director should treat all 
shareholders equally and not give preference over a shareholder or group of 
shareholders. 
 
The new South African Companies Act142 has codified some of the 
common law duties of a director. Davis et al notes that, the codified duties are 
subject to, and not in substitution for the directors’ duties in terms of the common 
law. The effect of the above is that the ‘courts still have regard to the common 
law, including past case law when interpreting the provisions of the new 
                                            
137
 1980(4) SA 156. 
138
 Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v. Jorgensen 1980(4) SA 156 at 157. 
139
 Ibid. 
140
 Ibid. 
141
 Eric M. Fogel and Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the house: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Independent Board of Directors, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (2007) at 60. Available at 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T69040
56996&format=GNBFI&sort=BOOLEAN&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T6904056999&cisb=22_T
6904056998&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=138474&docNo=5 [Accessed 6 June 2009]. 
142
 Section 76 of the new Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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Companies Act.’143 One of the reasons behind the codification the director’s 
duties is to create certainty and accessibility of the director’s duties. In the United 
Kingdom similar codification of director’s duties have also taken place. Reasons 
for codifying include making development of the law in this area more predictable 
(but without hindering development of the law by the courts).For the purposes of 
this research, I shall not discuss in detail how each duty of the director operates, 
as that would be going outside the scope of the topic. 
 
In summary, this chapter discussed the role and composition of the board 
of directors in line with the King II recommendations. Under this discussion, we 
observed that South Africa has largely adopted a unitary board system, which 
brings together the executive and non-executive directors. The chapter also 
highlighted some of the King II recommendations such as having a board, which 
is composed of a majority independent directors and the need to have a split role 
between the CEO and the chairperson. From there, the chapter also looked at 
the main role of the board. The roles that were discussed include engaging in 
corporate social responsibility and corporate decisions making. Lastly, the 
chapter briefly discussed the duties of director. The next chapter analysis the 
concept of an independent director and attempts to explain the concept before 
looking at his role in corporate governance.   
                                            
143 D. Davies et al Companies and other business structures in South Africa, (2009) at 103. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONCEPT OF AN INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR 
3.1 Introduction 
The independent director is often appointed to provide a breadth of experience 
and specialist knowledge that may present the board with valuable insights or 
key contacts in related industries.144 Additionally, the independent director may 
possess certain personal qualities that may assist the board in carrying out its 
functions.145 Most importantly, the independent director is appointed because of 
his independence of management and any of its interested parties.146 That is to 
say, the independent director can bring a degree of objectivity to the board's 
deliberations and play a valuable role in monitoring executive management. 
 
Generally, most legislation147 does not distinguish the executive director 
from the independent director or non-executive director. In other words, such 
legislation does not distinguish between the two directors for the purposes of 
ascertaining the duties they owe to the company, as the independent director is 
subject to the same duties as the executive director.148 The law expects both 
directors to discharge their duties as a collective body.149 As an aside, although 
all directors may seem to have the same legal responsibilities, the very existence 
of the independent director implies that his role is in some way different to that of 
the executive directors.150 Stapledon asserts that, the key difference between the 
two directors mainly arises out of the monitoring role fulfilled by independent 
directors.151 
 
 
                                            
144
 The Role of a non-executive director at 1. Available 
http://www.iod.com/intershoproot/eCS/Store/en/pdfs/roleofnxds.pdf [Accessed 25 June 2009]. 
145
 Ibid. Personalities such as good character, and the right attitude 
146
 Ibid. 
147
 Here, I refer to legislation found in countries that share a similar corporate governance system with 
South Africa. For example, the Australia, UK and USA.  
148
 Howard v Herrigel 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 661H. 
149
 Ibid. 
150
 G.P. Stapledon, Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance, (1996) at 144. 
151
 Ibid. 
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3.2 The Director under South African Law 
The current Companies Act defines a director as including, ‘any person 
occupying the position of director or alternate director of a company, by whatever 
name he may be designated.’152 The new Companies Act also carries a very 
similar definition, which states that, a director is a member of the board of a 
company or alternate director of a company or any person occupying the position 
of a director by whatever name designated.153  
 
From the above definitions, it is interesting to note that the current 
Companies Act ‘seems to imply that, a person who does not carry the title of a 
director, but is de facto acting as a director could be treated as a director for the 
purposes of the Act.’154 The purpose of the above provision may be to avoid 
corporate officers escaping liability for wrongful acts committed while acting in 
the capacity of a director, but without necessarily holding the title of a director. 
Furthermore, from the above definitions, we also note that both pieces of 
legislation do not carry a definition that distinguishes between an executive 
director and an independent director. 
 
The court in Howard v Herrigel 155  noted that there is no real distinction in 
law between the executive director and non-executive director as both are 
subject to the same duties. In this case, the court also noted that: 
 
It is unhelpful and even misleading to classify the company 
directors as executives or non-executives (Independent Director) 
for the purposes of ascertaining their duties to the company… No 
such distinction is to be found in any statute. At common law, once 
a person accepts an appointment as director, he becomes a 
fiduciary in relation to the company and is obliged to display the 
                                            
152
 Section 1 of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
153
 Section 1 of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
154
 Wixley and Everingham, Corporate Governance (2002) at 17. 
155
 1991 (2) SA 660 (A). 
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utmost good faith towards the company in his dealing on its 
behalf.156 
  
The Court went further to note that ‘…it also is not helpful to say of a 
particular director that, because he was not an executive director his duties were 
less onerous that they would have been if he had been an executive director.’157 
Whether the enquiry is one in relation to negligence, reckless conduct or fraud, 
the legal rules are the same for all directors.158 However, the expected standard 
of care is higher for executive directors who have a service contract with the 
company and transact with the company on a regular basis as compared to an 
independent director. 
 
In similar jurisdictions such as the UK, the Companies Act159 defines a 
director as including any person occupying the position of director by whatever 
name called, but does not distinguish between an executive director and a non-
executive director. The court in Dorchester Finance Co v Stebbing160, when called 
upon to decide the liability of a non-executive director, noted that a director in 
carrying out his or her duties was required to exhibit… a degree of skill as may 
be reasonably be expected from a person with his or her knowledge and 
experience. The director was also required to take such care as an ordinary 
person might be expected to take and must exercise any power vested in him 
with good faith and in the company’s interest. Most importantly, the court noted 
that in applying the above standards no distinction is to be drawn between the 
executive and non-executive directors.161 
 
From the above case law, we observe that, the independent director is 
equally liable in law as the executive director. Most importantly, we also note 
                                            
156
 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 661H. 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at  661I 
159
 Section 250 of United Kingdom‟s Companies Act 2006 Chapter 46 
160
 1989 Butterworth Company Law Cases 498. 
161
 (1989) Butterworth Company Law Cases 498 at paragraph e-f. 
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that, in law there is no clear distinction between the executive director and the 
non-executive director. Below is a brief comparative analysis of how the current 
Companies Act and the new Companies Act attempt to define the independent 
director and the tests for the independence of a director under South African law. 
 
3.2.1 The independent director under the current Companies Act 
The closest attempt to define an independent director is found under s 269A 4(b) 
(i)-(ii) of the current Companies Act, which deals with members of the audit 
committee. In terms of this section, a non-executive director is a director who is 
not involved in the day-to-day management of the company and has not been in 
full-time employment with the company in the last three years.162 In addition, such 
a director should ‘not be a member of the immediate family of any individual who 
has been involved in the day-to-day management or been a full-time employee in 
the past three years.’163  
 
In terms of the current Companies Act, a director acts independently 
through expressing his or her opinions, exercising judgement and making 
decisions impartially.164 Furthermore, a director acts independently if that director 
is not related to the company or to any shareholder, supplier, customer or other 
director of the company in a way that would lead a reasonable and informed third 
party to conclude that, the integrity, impartiality or objectivity of that director is 
compromised by that relationship.165  
 
The above essentially involves the inherent quality test and the relational 
test. The inherent quality tests in effect means a director must be impartial and 
independent when making decisions i.e. a director must not be biased towards a 
certain individual or individuals when making decisions. A drawback of the test is 
                                            
162
 Section 269A (4) (b) (i) of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
163
 Section 269A (4) (b) (ii) of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
164
 Section 269 (4) (c) (i-ii) of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. 
165
Section 269 (4) (c) (ii) of the Companies Act No 61 of 1973. The Reasonable and informed third party 
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that it focuses on impartiality as a requirement for being independent and does 
not consider other qualities such as character, attitude and skills. It also leads us 
to believe that only certain directors need to be independent yet independence is 
a requirement for all directors. Lastly, the test has always existed in the common 
law and may not warrant incorporation into statute. 
 
3.2.2 The independent director under the new Companies Act 
The new Companies Act focuses on features that are commonly attributed to a 
non-executive director as members of the audit committee such as, not been 
involved in the day-to-day management of the company’s business. The new 
Companies Act also notes that the member of the audit committee ‘must not be a 
material supplier or customer of the company, such that a reasonable and 
informed third party would conclude in the circumstances that the integrity, 
impartiality or objectivity of that director is compromised by that relationship.’166  
 
A significant difference under the new Companies Act is that, it gives the 
Minister the power to prescribe additional requirements for members of the audit 
committee.167 The new Companies Act has dropped the inherent quality test and 
focused on the compromising relation.  
 
 The above was a brief illustration of how local legislation has attempted to 
define the independent director. Below is an analysis of how the various codes 
have defined the independent director.  
 
3.3 Defining the Independent Director through corporate governance 
codes 
In terms of the King II, a non-executive director is an individual not involved in the 
day-to-day management of the company and is not a full-time salaried employee 
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 Section 94 (4) (iii) of the Companies Act No 71 of 2008. 
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of the company or any of its subsidiaries.168 The King II also gives reference to an 
independent director non-executive director. This director is not a representative 
of a shareowner and is able to control or significantly influence the management 
of the company. Furthermore, the King II notes that the company or the group, of 
which it currently forms part, must also not have employed the independent 
director in any executive capacity for the preceding three financial years.169 In 
terms of the King II, the requirements to qualify as an independent non-executive 
director are slightly more onerous in comparison to those for one to qualify as a 
non-executive director.170  
 
The King II sets out a vast number of compromising situations or relations 
the independent non-executive director may not be involved.171 In comparison, 
the non-executive director only need not be in full time employment of the 
company and its subsidiaries or be involved in the day-day management of the 
company. Nonetheless, the underlying principle from the King II is that, both the 
independent director and non-executive director must have no material ties with 
the company on which they serve as directors. In other words, the director must 
be detached as much as possible from the company on which they serve as 
board members.172  
 
                                            
168
 King II Paragraph 2.4.3. Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za [Accessed 8 June 2009]. 
169
 King II Paragraph 2.4.3. Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za [Accessed 8 June 2009]. 
170 The King II also goes further to list other compromising situations in which the Independent director 
should not be involved in like, paragraph 2.4.3 (IV). The director should not be a professional advisor to 
the company or the group, other than in a director capacity. Paragraph 2.4.3 (vii), the director should be 
free from any business or other relationship that could be seen to materially interfere with the individual‟s 
capacity to act in an independent manner. 
171
 Ibid. 
172
 The difference between the non-executive director and the independent non-executive director has 
largely remained the same under the draft King Three Report. In fact, the King III introduces a new director 
termed the lead independent director who provides leadership and advice to the board when the chairperson 
has a conflict of interest. For more information, consult King Three Report for Governance in South Africa 
at 50-51. Available at http://www.iodsa.co.za  
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The New York Stock Exchange Rules (Rules) stipulate all listed 
companies must have majority independent directors.173 The Rules also state 
that, for a person to qualify as an independent director, the board of directors 
must affirmatively determine that the potential director has no material 
relationship with the listed company.174 In addition, a director who is an employee 
or whose immediate family member is an executive officer, of the company is not 
independent until three years after the end of such employment relationship.175 
Moreover, the director or an immediate family member must not be a current 
partner of a firm that is the company’s internal or external auditor.176 The Rules 
go further to list other requirements that the potential director must meet before 
qualifying as an independent director, which I shall not be list here but will 
discuss below in comparison with the other codes. 
 
In Australia, the Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best 
Practice Recommendations (Principles) govern director’s independence. In the 
same manner as the King II and the Rules, the Principles list a number of 
requirements a person must meet before they may qualify as an independent 
director. Some of these requirements include, an independent director must not 
be a substantial shareholder of the company or be an officer of the company. 
The independent director must also within the last three years not have been 
employed in an executive capacity by the company or another group member, or 
been a director after ceasing to hold such employment.177 The Principles also list 
                                            
173
 New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, s 303A.01. Available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%
5F3%5F1&CiRestriction=303A&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F [Accessed 25 
June 2009]. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
176
 New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, s 303A.01. Available at 
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp%5F1%5F4%
5F3%5F1&CiRestriction=303A&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F [Accessed 25 
June 2009]. 
177
 Australian Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations (Principles), 
Principles Box 2.1 at 20. Available at 
http://www.shareholder.com/shared/dynamicdoc/ASX/364/ASXRecommendations.pdf [Accessed 25 June 
2009]. 
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five other factors that need to be taken into account in considering whether a 
director is independent.178 
 
According to the Vienot Two Report of France, ‘a director is independent 
when he or she has no relationship of any kind whatsoever with the corporation, 
its group or the management of either that is such as to colour his or her 
judgement.’179 As such, an independent director must be one who is devoid of 
particular bonds of interest with any significant shareholder, employee or other.180 
The Vienot Two Report also lists the criteria used for a director to qualify as a 
non-executive director and for preventing conflicts of interests. For example, the 
director must not be an employee or corporate officer of the corporation, or an 
employee or director of its parent company or a company that it consolidates. In 
addition, the director must not have been in the above positions for the preceding 
five years.181 Equally important, the Vienot Two Report requires that the director 
not have been an auditor of the corporation within the previous five years.  
 
The U.K Combined Code182 also lists a number of circumstances, the 
existence of which may be relevant in determining a director’s independence. For 
a director to qualify as an independent non-executive director, that director 
amongst other factors, must not have been an employee of the company or 
                                            
178
 These factors include, within the last three years has not been a principal of a material professional 
adviser or a material consultant to the company or another group member, or an 
employee materially associated with the service provided; has not served on the board for a period which 
could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director‟s ability to act in the best 
interests of the company; is free from any interest and any business or other relationship which could, or 
could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the director‟s ability to act in the best interests 
of the company. Available at 
http://www.shareholder.com/shared/dynamicdoc/ASX/364/ASXRecommendations.pdf [Accessed 25 June 
2009]. 
179 Hopt et al, European Corporate Governance in company law and codes, Report prepared for the 
European Corporate Governance Conference of October 18, The Hague, The Netherlands at 17. Available 
at http://corpgov.nl/at/downloads/Final%20Report2.pdf [Accessed 14 June 2009]. 
180
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group within the last five years. Furthermore, the director must not represent a 
significant shareholder and have no close family ties with any of the company’s 
advisers, directors or senior employees.183  
 
It is also worth noting that U.K Combined Code introduces the concept of 
a senior independent director. The purpose of the senior independent director is 
to act as an intermediary for ‘shareholders if they have concerns of which contact 
through the normal channels of chairperson, CEO or finance director has failed to 
resolve or for which such contact is inappropriate.’184 Similar provisions are also 
contained in the King II185 and the Draft King III. The King III notes that a lead 
independent director’s role is to provide advice to the board and lead the board in 
situation where the chairperson has a conflict of interest.186 
 
A close analysis of the above codes reveals some important differences in 
the manner in which the codes define the independent director. Below is a 
comparative analysis of definitions emanating from the above-mentioned 
corporate codes. 
 
3.4 A comparative analysis of the independent director definitions  
In assessing the materiality of a director’s relationship, the Rules require the 
board to consider the issue not merely from the standpoint of the director, but 
also the person or organisations with which the director has an affiliation.187 As 
such, in assessing the materiality of a director’s relationship, the Rules 
encourage boards to adopt and disclose categorical standards to assist the 
board in making determinations of independence. The Rules also compel boards 
                                            
183
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to make a general disclosure if a director meets these standards.188 Adopting 
categorical standards allows corporate boards certain latitude to determine 
director independence by considering the circumstances and relationships of 
director’s individually. Similarly, the UK Combined Code requires boards to adopt 
categorical standards to be used to determine director independence. The 
Combined Code and the Rules approach, is advantageous in that it allows the 
board to take into consideration the varying circumstances surrounding each 
director’s appointment instead of having an approach that is based on the 
premise that one shoe size fits all. 
 
The Rules also provide that the basis for a board determination that a 
relationship is not material must be disclosed in the company’s annual proxy 
statement.189 Disclosing a categorical standard used to ascertain director 
independence provides investors with an opportunity assess the quality of the 
board independence while avoiding excessive disclosure of immaterial 
relationships and information.190 In contrast, the King II requires no such 
disclosure on the basis that the board determined a relationship is immaterial. 
The King II only requires that the board ascertain that the individuals appointed to 
the board are fit and proper and are not disqualified from being directors. In 
addition, the King II requires that, in ascertaining whether the individuals are fit 
and proper, the director’s background should be investigated along the lines of 
the approach required for listed companies by the JSE and under the Banks 
Act.191 Equally interesting is that, other corporate codes from Australia, UK and 
France require no such disclosure or the basis of non-disclosure.  
 
In contrast to the UK Combined Code, the King II and the Principles, the 
Rules introduce a three-year look back period. The three-year look back period 
applies when determining whether a director is independent using the categorical 
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standard adopted by the board. The three-year look back provision entails that, 
the board must consider the director’s relationships or interests in the three years 
immediately preceding the appointment.192 However, when applying the look back 
provision, for example, listed companies need not consider individuals who are 
no longer immediate family members because of legal separation or divorce, or 
those who have died or become incapacitated.193 The inclusion of the look back 
provision in the Rules may be attributed to the highly rule based Corporate 
Governance system approach adopted by the America. In similarity with the 
Rules, the Vienot Report has a similar provision although it provides for a longer 
look back period of five years.194  
 
The similarities that may be drawn from the above codes are that, 
Principles and the King II require that the company or the group of which it 
currently forms, to not have employed the independent director in any executive 
capacity. In contrast, the Rules and the UK Combined Code note that an 
independent director must not have been an employee (including an executive) 
of the company. Ritchie asserts that, this is an important difference in that the 
Rules and the UK Combined Code essentially prevent non-executive employees 
of the company from becoming independent directors.195The advantage of the 
Principles and to a similar extent the King II is that, a company’s senior non-
executive employees could function effectively as directors. These senior non-
executive employees are aware of the company’s functioning at an operational 
level, and understand a company’s day-to-day running which in turn gives them a 
greater ability to make sound decisions at a board level. 
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The King II also notes that, an independent director must not be a 
professional advisor to the company or group, other than in a director capacity.196 
Similarly, the Principles state that, an independent director must not have been 
(within the last three years) a principal or employee of a material professional 
advisor or consultant.197 However, under the Rules, an independent director is 
one who has not been within the last three years a partner or employee of that 
firm that performs the company’s internal and or external financial audits.198 
 
Arguably, the Principles and the King II are more advantageous in that, 
they encompass all ‘material professional advisors which would include financial 
auditors, strategic consultants, media advisors, business advisors, and 
importantly lawyers, so long as their advice is material is material to the 
company.’199 Essentially, under the Rules, a person may qualify as an 
independent director so as long as they never provided the company with audit 
services within the last three years. In contrast to the Rules, we note that the 
King II and the Principles take a more stringent view of a director’s employment 
as a company consultant through encompassing all material advisors thus 
excluding such directors from appointment. 
 
As an aside, we also note that the Rules only disqualify from appointment 
individuals who in the past have performed financial audit services for the 
company. This disqualification is primarily based on two reasons. Firstly, financial 
auditors have intimate knowledge of the company’s financial data and it is 
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essential that the auditing process remains independent of the company. 
Secondly, the Rules were promulgated in reaction to the corporate collapses in 
America, which were largely caused by poor or biased financial auditing.200 
Nonetheless, the Rules provide greater certainty through specifically referring to 
financial auditors, in comparison to the King II and the Principles that give 
reference to material advisors, which may be problematic in interpreting what 
constitutes a material advisor. 
 
What mainly emanates from the above definitions is that, the independent 
director is an individual who should not have any material ties with the company 
in which the directorship is held. However, what the various codes seem to omit 
from the definitions is that independence is more of a state of mind than an 
objective fact and perception.201 There is a clear lack of attention to soft factors of 
independence, like the character and attitude of the individual. Instead, the 
definitions mainly on the structure that amounts to director independence. For 
instance, an independent director cannot be an active or previous employee or 
member of management, a representative of shareholder, a professional adviser, 
supplier, and customer or closely related to the previous parties.202  
 
However, there are some codes, which recognise that independence is 
not only a formal issue but also one that has largely to do with the director’s 
character, attitude and personality towards the company.203 For example, the 
United Kingdom’s Combined Code differs from other codes in that it takes into 
account certain soft issues the board must consider when appointing an 
independent director. The UK Combined Code states that, 
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The board should determine whether the director is independent in 
character and judgement and whether there are relationships or 
circumstances which are likely to affect, or could appear to affect, 
the director’s judgement.204  
 
The UK Combined Code illustrates that, it is important for independence to 
not only focus on the structural issues, but also highlight the importance of the 
soft issues such as character, attitude and integrity. 
 
Although it may be extremely difficult to legislate on the soft characteristics 
or soft issues an independent director must possess, measures should still be 
put in place to examine the independence of the director before appointment. 
Such an examination may involve analysing the potential director’s personal 
record of integrity and moral character. The fact that a ‘person under 
consideration seems to care a lot about his or her own reputation will influence 
the potential director’s willingness to do the job right.’205  
 
Having discussed how legislation and corporate codes define the 
independent director, the next part of this dissertation examines the role of the 
independent director in corporate governance.  
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3.5 The role of the Independent Director  
3.5.1 Introduction 
In terms of legislation, neither the current Companies Act nor the new 
Companies Act, clearly spell out the role of an independent director except as 
members of the audit committee. Similarly, in other jurisdictions like the USA, the 
SOX, ‘has no role for a non-executive director other than as an audit committee 
member...’ 206  
 
As legislation does not clearly define the role of the independent director, 
the duty is upon the company through its Memorandum of Incorporation or 
Articles of Association to set out what the company expects from the 
independent director. However, the role bestowed upon the independent director 
in terms of the Articles of Association or Memorandum of Incorporation must not 
conflict with the Companies Act or other legislation regulating companies.  
 
In carrying out his mandate, the independent director is not required to 
possess entrepreneurial qualities, but is expected to challenge the thinking of the 
board of directors and bring commercial skill and experience to the board 
decision-making process.207 In other words, the independent director should be 
willing and be able to ask the board difficult questions relating to board 
operations to ensure that decisions are sensibly thought through before the 
board adopts them. Moreover, in carrying out this mandate, corporate 
governance expects the independent director to ensure the board pays attention 
to the interests of minority shareholders who may not have board 
representation.208  
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Generally, the independent director’s role involves participating as a board 
member, executing the board mandate and bringing a wider experience and new 
ideas to board discussions. The independent director is also expected to focus 
on board matters and avoid straying into the work of executive management, as 
this may cloud the director’s objectivity thus leading him into not being able to 
provide an independent view of the company operations.209  
 
The independent director also has the general responsibility of acting as 
an advisor to the management of the company and ensuring that management 
operates the company in the best interests of its owners. The above involves the 
independent director playing an accountability role, which involves monitoring 
management.  
 
The role of the independent director also involves acting as a whistle 
blower, ensuring adherence to good corporate practices and respect for the 
interests of the other stakeholders.210 In essence, the above means the 
independent director’s main roles are, monitoring executive management and 
ensuring compliance to good corporate governance practices.211 Below is a 
detailed analysis of the roles of the independent director. 
 
3.5.2 Monitoring Role 
As a starting point, the board fulfils a pivotal role in corporate governance 
through monitoring top management by establishing various mechanisms (e.g. 
remuneration committees) that mitigate the incentives for managers to act 
opportunistically. Naturally, the independent director assumes the monitoring 
role, as inside or executive directors are part of the management team and 
hence cannot monitor themselves. In carrying out this monitoring role the 
independent director attempts to ensure that the actions of the CEO and other 
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executive directors pursue shareholder interests.212 Dixion et al assert that, the 
independent director is an effective as monitor when he asks tough questions to 
executives. In other words, the independent director should be willing and able to 
question executives over decisions they make on behalf of the company. 
Furthermore, as a vigilant outside monitor, the independent director can provide 
an independent judgement in areas that affect the executive directors, such as 
remuneration213, appointments and dismissals.214   
 
It is important that an independent director’s vigilance extend to legally 
problematic self-dealing between the controlling shareholder and the corporation. 
That is to say,  
 
An independent director's alertness and willingness to question and 
object may lead a controlling shareholder to abandon a proposed 
course of action or to undo what has already been done.215  
 
De Mott asserts that, vigilance in the above form also forces the hand of a 
recalcitrant controlling shareholder by forcing an explicit confrontation. A 
controlling shareholder who retaliates against a vigilant independent director, for 
example by removing the director from the board, has taken a visible step that 
may attract unwanted external attention. This risk may inhibit retaliation or 
channel it into less immediate or visible measures.’216 
 
At times, the monitoring role of the independent director has been 
criticised, as ‘there has been an over-emphasis on the monitoring role of the 
                                            
212
  Rob Dixion, Keith Milton and Anne Woodhead, An investigation into the role and effectiveness and 
future of non-executive directors, Journal of General management Vol. 31 No.1 Autumn 2005 at 3. 
213
 As shall be discussed later in this dissertation, the monitoring role of the independent director is very 
important in attempting to curb excessive executive remuneration. 
214
 Note 211 at 3. 
215
 DeMott, Deborah A. "Guests at the table? Independent directors in family-influenced public 
companies. ” (Summer 2008): 33.4 819 The Journal of Corporation Law. Academic One 
File. Gale. Available at http://www.find.galegroup.com/itx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC- [Accessed 2 
June 2009].   
216
 Ibid. 
Un
ive
sit
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
47 
 
independent director.’217 Due to this over emphasis, ‘considerable management 
time has been spent providing the independent director with detailed information 
to questions and justification for strategies.’218 The above has over burdened 
management, which in turn has diverted management from its core duties of 
running the company. However, there is currently limited evidence to support the 
hypothesis that accountability and monitoring constrains the enterprise.219 
 
The monitoring role has also been criticised on the grounds that, it may 
create a possible. For example, 
 
If non-executive directors… gain real experience over time and are 
able to do the job efficiently, they avoid liability but they may not be 
independent and their role may conflict with the executive functions 
of the chief executive officer.220 
 
 That is to say, at times when the independent director serves for long 
periods on boards, he tends to gain a substantial amount of experience and 
begin to encroach into the daily affairs of the company, which are ideally 
reserved for the executives. This encroachment may lead to a strain in the 
relationship between the independent director and other executive directors. 
Furthermore, independent directors who act as whistle blowers, stand to destroy 
any working relationship that the independent director has with the executive 
management. 
 
3.5.3 Strategy Development 
Flowing from the monitoring role, the independent director is also tasked with the 
role of strategy development. The board is collectively involved in the strategy 
formulation, setting of policies and acquiring and redistributing resources within 
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the company. The independent director assists in strategy formulation through 
‘bringing a breath of vision, experience, environmental scanning and being 
available as a sounding board for the CEO.’221 In carrying out the strategy 
development role, the independent director may be helpful through possessing a 
clearer or wider view of external factors affecting the company and its business 
environment than the executive directors. 
 
The role and contribution of the independent director towards strategy 
formulation may at times be limited depending on the director’s ‘skill and 
motivation or contextual factors such as changing board dynamics.’222 For 
instance, the independent director may be willing to assist in strategy 
development, but may be unable to do so due to board dynamics such as a 
domineering chairperson who imposes his or her ideas on the board.223 
 
3.5.4 Negotiation and Conflict resolution  
Companies expect the independent director to mediate in conflict of interest 
situations, for instance between management and the shareholders or between 
board members and the shareholders. Ideally, if any of the above situations were 
to unfold, the company forms a committee consisting of independent directors to 
assess the situation. The independent director  also assists in controlling conflict 
of interest in areas such as CEO compensation and succession as it is often very 
difficult for an executive director to be adverse to a sitting CEO. 
 
An independent director also plays a negotiation role on behalf of public 
shareholders, for instance, when the controlling shareholder proposes to cash 
out the public equity in an ongoing-private transaction. The negotiating role is 
largely dependent on how tactful the director is in negotiating and whether he is 
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able to reject the transaction. Here, we note that the director’s character and 
experience are important in order for the director to negotiate effectively. The 
negotiation role of the independent director is also very important when it comes 
to negotiating the remuneration package for the CEO.224 
 
3.5.5 Communication Role 
The board may benefit from outside contacts and opinions. An important function 
of the independent director can therefore be to help connect the business and 
board with networks of potentially useful people and organisations. In some 
cases, due to the outside contacts the independent director possess, the 
company may call upon the independent director to represent the company 
externally.225 
 
From a different perspective, whilst on the audit committee, the 
independent director fulfils a communication role between the external auditors 
and board of directors. Here, the independent director assists in facilitating the 
easy flow of information to the board of directors to enable them to carry out their 
respective mandate. 
 
Barratt et al226 assert that, the independent director acts as a boundary 
spanner, spanning the boundary between the organisation and its environment. 
Barratt et al further argue that, the independent director assists in feeding back 
information about stakeholders’ wants and needs, whilst simultaneously feeding 
out information to stakeholders about the organisation.227  
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The above may assist in promoting transparency within the organisation 
through facilitating the free flow of information. Transparency is a key element of 
good corporate governance as it allows the board, shareholders and 
stakeholders to interact freely without fearing that certain information is being 
withheld. As noted above, to encourage further transparency, the independent 
director is ‘sometimes employed specifically to attend to certain stakeholder 
group, which gives the independent director a unique perspective on stakeholder 
management.228 On the other hand, independent director needs to proceed with 
caution, as the above initiative is likely to lead to role conflict particularly if 
expectations are not clearly defined within the governance mechanisms of the 
organisation.229 As such, there is need to clearly define the expectations of the 
independent director when carrying out this mandate.  
 
3.5.6 General factors influencing the role of the independent director 
Although the independent director has three main roles, there are also a range of 
contextual or environmental factors that may shape and influence the roles and 
expectations of the independent director.230 These factors include the extent of 
regulation within the industry, the presence of influential stakeholders outside the 
organisation and the potential for mergers and acquisitions activity.231  
 
Regarding the extent of regulation within the industry, the growth in 
number and scope of Regulatory bodies in the UK has had an impact on 
organisations. For instance, UK Finance directors often comment on the ever-
increasing power and numerous regulations and responsibilities cast upon them 
by the Financial Services Authority.232 The ever-growing power of such a body 
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has an impact on the roles and expectations of board members.233 For example, 
the independent director may have to carry out more vigilant monitoring to 
ensure that the company complies with all the regulations from the Financial 
Services Authority.  
 
Another factor influencing the role of the independent director is the 
presence of active stakeholders outside the organisation. For example, 
stakeholders such as environmental lobbyist and corporate social responsibility 
campaigners may influence the manner in which the board carries out its 
functions.234 These lobbyists and corporate social responsibility campaigners 
compel companies to be aware of and respond adequately to social needs of 
society. The King II notes that companies need to be non-discriminatory, non-
exploitative and be responsible with regard to environmental and human rights 
issues, which in turn has the potential to increase productivity and corporate 
reputation.235 As such, the above increases the monitoring role of the 
independent director, as the director needs to ensure that the company is 
operating in a sustainable manner, which is cognisant of the society. 
 
The figure below attempts to show the influence the independent director 
has in the corporate governance setup of an organisation. The independent 
director being at the centre of the company acts as a link between the company 
and outsiders. Additionally, by being at the centre of an organisation, the figure 
highlights the mediation or negotiation role the director undertakes in an 
organisation. Moreover, it also attempts to draw attention to the personal 
attributes an independent director must possess in order to be effective in 
carrying out his role.236 
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3.5.7 Non-Executive Director Boundary Influencers237 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From this chapter we note that, most corporate codes tend to define the 
independent director as an individual not involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the company and one who has no material relation with the company. We also 
observed that, the independent director has three primary roles, which are 
monitoring management, strategy development, and communication roles. 
Furthermore, the role and expectations of the independent director are influenced 
by the extent of regulation within the industry and presence of active 
stakeholders outside the organisation. 
 
The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of how the independent 
director carries out the above-mentioned roles on board committee.
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CHAPTER 4: THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR IN ACTION 
4.1 Audit Committee 
‘The audit committee is a subcommittee of the board of directors, without 
executive powers, which oversees the internal and external audit process of the 
firm.’238 Its role is to, 
 
Maintain a continuing review of the corporation’s financial data and 
to ensure that the firm has adequate internal controls, appropriate 
accounting policies, and ensure that external auditors deter fraud 
and promote high quality and timely financial statements.239 
 
 In South Africa, the current Companies Act240 and the new Companies 
Act241 require certain companies to have audit committees242. Similarly, the King II 
also recommends that companies have audit committees.243 The statutory role of 
the audit committee as per the new Companies Act is, amongst other things, to 
nominate for appointment the companies external auditor, prepare a report to be 
included in the annual financial statements for that financial year and pre-
approve any agreement for non audit services.244 In essence, it ensures that the 
financial data of the company is accurately presented. 
 
 Ensuring the proper representation of financial data is an important 
indication of company’s financial health. As the financial data represents the 
financial health of the company, the audit committee, through the monitoring role 
played by the independent director ensures that management is not tempted into 
presenting a rosy picture of the company’s performance through modifying the 
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numbers and thus avoiding incisive questions from the board as to its 
performance.245 Furthermore, through overseeing the firm’s financial reporting 
process, the independent director assists in preventing fraudulent accounting 
practices. 
 
 The audit committee has two potential advantages, which are 
independence and board efficiency. Independence is an essential requirement 
for any board committee to function effectively. ‘The independence and integrity 
of monitoring may be enhanced by having both internal and external auditors 
report to a subset of the board that consists of outside directors.’246 Therefore, to 
allow the independent director to carry out effectively his monitoring and 
compliance role in the audit committee, it is essential that the committee be 
composed of independent directors who are truly independent, willing and able to 
do the work.247 That is to say, audit committee members should not be associated 
with management in order to allow the committee members to perform their 
oversight role and motivate external auditors to be impartial.248 
 
The second advantage of the audit committee is that, ‘board committees 
can help improve the efficiency of the board functioning as it can investigate 
problems in greater depth and detail than the entire board.’249 In order to 
investigate problems in greater depth and detail, it is also essential that the 
independent director on the audit committee be financially literate. Financial 
literacy increases the likelihood that the independent director is able to recognise 
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potentially misleading transactions or financial statements. In turn, the above 
contributes to high quality reporting. As an aside, if the independent director is 
financially independent of management, it also assists the director to withstand 
pressure to manipulate earnings.  
 
From the above we note that, it is essential that the audit committee be 
independent to allow a ‘high degree of active oversight and lower incidences of 
financial statement fraud.’250 The Enron audit committee was a classical example 
of a committee that lacked independence and was often clouded with conflict of 
interest. The committee’s non-executive directors failed to police their auditors 
due to serious conflicts of interest involving members of the audit committee. For 
instance, Wendy Gramm was the chairperson of Enron’s audit committee and 
her husband, a senator, received substantial political donation from Enron. 
Furthermore, Lord Wakeham was on the audit committee at the same time as 
having a consultancy contract with Enron.251 Surely, the above scenarios show 
that the people in the responsible positions, who should have detected the 
unethical activities, were themselves inadequately positioned to do so. 
 
4.2 Remuneration Committee 
Executive remuneration has generated a great deal of attention within the field of 
corporate governance. Especially after the revelation that the ‘Enron board 
enjoyed remuneration packages of twice the national average for public 
corporations.’252 In 2000, the directors of Enron were said to be receiving an 
annual fee of US$350,000.253 However, even after the revelations of Enron, 
executive remuneration has remained high. For instance, South African directors 
continue to receive lucrative excessive remuneration. In 2004, the average 
CEO’s package was R4.3 million excluding share options, the average Chief 
                                            
250
 Ibid. 
251
 Jill Solomon, Aris Solomon Corporate Governance and Accountability 2
nd
 Ed (2007) Wiley, at 41. 
252
 David Campbell and Stephen Griffin, Enron and the end of Corporate Governance? at 51. Chapter 3 in 
Global Governance and the Quest for Justice Vol 2, Corporate Governance. 
253
 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
56 
 
Financial Officer’s (CFO) package was R2.6 million and the average executive 
director received a total package of R2.4 million.254 In order to curb such 
excessive remuneration, most corporate codes recommend companies to set up 
remuneration committees. 
 
 The main task of the remuneration committee is to ensure that directors 
are appropriately rewarded for their work in a manner that will ensure as far as 
possible the recruitment, retention and motivation of people with the skills the 
company needs.255 Furthermore, it is essential that, executive remuneration be 
structured so that, the executive’s interests are aligned with those of the 
shareholders. For instance, stock based compensation for directors, which is 
restricted as to resale during their term in office, may enhance the alignment of 
director interests with those of shareholders.256 
 
 The King II recommends that the remuneration committee be composed 
entirely or mainly of independent non-executive directors.257 Furthermore, the 
CEO of the company should play no part in determining his or her own 
remuneration. However, the CEO should be consulted to obtain his or her input 
regarding the remuneration of other directors.258  Ideally, the responsibility for 
determining executive pay should be handled by independent directors as they 
have good knowledge of the company, and have no personal financial interest in 
the remuneration decisions they make.259 Additionally, having a majority 
independent director on the remuneration committee allows the determination of 
executive remuneration to be viewed in a more detached way from the executive 
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directors.260 At the same time, tasking the independent director with the 
responsibilities for recommending remuneration levels and packages also assists 
in controlling potential conflict and lends credibility to the committee 
recommendations.  
  
 However, despite tasking the remuneration committees with the 
responsibility of curbing executive remuneration, the remuneration levels remain 
high for a variety of reasons, of which some I have discussed below. 
 
 Firstly, the remuneration committees have often been regarded as been 
inefficient in that they lack the information, expertise and negotiating skills 
necessary for hard negotiations with incumbent and incoming executives.261 For 
instance, some independent directors on the committee may lack the necessary 
negotiation tactics, including the power to reject the imposition of remuneration 
packages by a powerful CEO. Moreover, due to inadequate research into the 
competitive levels of pay, remuneration committees often transplant 
recommendations from the human resources department of which these 
recommendations are often those recommended by top management.262   
 
Secondly, Mongalo T highlights that  
The fact that non-executive directors who sit on the remuneration 
committee of one company are often executives of other 
companies and that when deciding on pay for the executives they 
[non-executive directors] will indirectly set the going rate for jobs of 
executives and this might ultimately affect them.263  
 
In other words, given the manner in which the independent directors on 
the remuneration committee act, it may show that, they do not act independently 
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and apply their minds towards the recommendations they make on executive 
remuneration. In essence, the independent directors are being influenced by 
external factors such as the effect on the [independent directors] of the 
remuneration packages, they recommend for executives. 
 
 Thirdly, remuneration committees tend to rely on compensation 
consultants to assist in determining executive remuneration.264 The major 
challenge with compensation consultants is that, the company management 
instead of the remuneration committee often hires these consultants. This has 
the potential of creating a conflict, as it is very difficult for these compensation 
consultants to make unbiased recommendations on executive remuneration.265 
The biasness of compensation consultants emanates from the fact that, 
compensation consultants obtain new clients based on their reputation, therefore 
it is always in their own personal interest to recommend high remuneration in 
order to attract more clients.266 
 
4.3 Nomination Committee 
The nomination committee is responsible for nominating individuals to serve on 
the firm’s board of directors. Essentially, their duty is to assist the board of 
directors in the responsibility of nominating directors. The King II recommends 
that, the nomination committee be composed of the board chairperson and non-
executive directors.267 The purpose of having a nomination committee is to 
separate the board nomination process from other board members such as the 
CEO. Separating the nomination process from the main board also increases the 
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possibility that board appointees will be more willing to act as advocates for 
shareholders.268 
 
 A nomination committee composed of a majority of independent directors 
lessens the influence of executive directors who are likely to appoint individuals 
who are inclined to follow the instructions of the CEO and executive 
management. Evidence suggests that a nomination committee composed of a 
majority of independent directors is more likely to appoint individuals who are not 
associated with management and with the capacity to challenge the decisions of 
the executive directors.269  
 
The nomination committee also serves to limit the appointment of nominee 
directors to the board. Institutional investors often appoint nominee directors for 
the purposes of acquiring inside knowledge of the company in which they would 
have invested. Acquiring inside knowledge of the company assists the investors 
to optimise their potential to safe guard their interests. However, a fundamental 
challenge with the above is that, ideally a nominee director should not take part 
in board processes in which a potential conflict of interest exists. Assuming the 
above principle is followed, the presence of the nominated director for the 
intended purpose becomes obsolete.270 Thus, it is important that, the independent 
directors on the nomination committee nominate individuals that have the 
capacity to act as advocates for all shareholders.271 
 
Having looked at the role of the independent director on the various 
corporate governance committees, we note that the independent director assists 
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in nominating directors who stand a greater chance of been shareholder 
advocates. We also note that, although to an arguable extent, the independent 
director assists in curbing executive remuneration. Now the question that arises 
is whether the roles fulfilled by the independent director add value to the 
company. 
 
4.4 Does the Independent Director add value to the company? 
4.4.1 Introduction 
Many diverging views have emerged regarding whether the independent director 
adds value to company. The main debate concerning whether the independent 
director adds value to the company centres on two issues, firstly, whether there 
is a causal link between firm performance and board composition and secondly, 
what conditions produce better board performance?  
 
Various studies have been conducted in an attempt to ascertain if the 
independent director adds value to corporate performance. For example, some 
studies have examined the ‘composition of the board (i.e. management versus 
independent directors), and whether or not separating the positions of CEO and 
chairperson (i.e. CEO\Duality) leads to improved firm performance.’272 Other 
studies have ‘examined the possible benefits to shareholders of boards that 
employ audit, compensation, and nominating committees composed entirely of 
outside independent directors.’273 
  
In analysing the relation between director independence and board 
effectiveness, Van den Berghe and Baelden observed that, an independent 
director needs to possess certain qualities before being able to influence the 
performance of the corporation. Some of the qualities identified by the Van den 
Berghe and Baelden include that the independent director must possess the right 
attitude in order to be a vigilant monitor and objective decision maker. Van den 
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Berghe and Baelden assert that, ‘an independent director without the right 
attitude to think and act independently will not be an effective independent 
director.’274 That is to say, for the independent director to add value to corporate 
performance, the independent director should have the ability and willingness to 
be probative, critical and as objective as possible.275 Furthermore, both the ability 
and willingness to carry out the above complement each other in that, without the 
ability, a director will not know when to object or be probative. In turn without the 
willingness, the ability to exercise an objective judgment becomes obsolete. 
 
Van den Berghe and Baelden also noted that the environment in which the 
independent director operates is equally essential in influencing whether the 
independent director adds value to corporate performance.276 The authors note 
that, ‘outside factors can block or stimulate the personal ability or willingness [of 
a director] to think and act independently.’277 In the same vein, since the board is 
a collegial body composed of human beings operating in a social system, group 
dynamics and interpersonal relations are very influential towards the director’s 
performance.278 For instance, interpersonal relations are important in that board 
members should be able to trust and respect one another’s judgment and 
expertise. 
 
In support of the value the independent director brings, other studies 
carried out by Barnhart showed that, having more outside independent directors 
on the board improves firm performance.279 Similarly, studies by Byrd and 
Hickman ‘have shown that shareholders benefit more when independent 
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directors have control of the board in tender offers for bidders and in hostile 
takeovers.’280 Jensen and Meckling also suggest that, a board composed of a 
greater proportion of outside directors, due to their presumed independence may 
theoretically lead to better firm performance.281  
 
In contrast, other studies have found no link between outside independent 
directors and improved firm performance.282 These studies have also revealed 
that no association exists between the personal characteristics (i.e. college 
degree, firm, industry or other professional experience) of outside independent 
directors and better firm performance. 
 
Having looked at the general studies regarding the influence of the 
independent director towards firm performance, below is a detailed analyses of 
studies carried out on the influence of the independent director towards firm 
performance in various sectors of the company.  
 
4.4.2 Audit Committees and Financial Statements 
Studies relating to the independent director and accurate financial reports vary 
greatly. Beasley conducted a research in which the results showed that, the 
presence of independent directors on audit committees did not increase the 
reliability of financial information.283 For example, the Enron Corporation audit 
committee. This committee operated under the Securities Exchange Commission 
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expanded rules on audit committee disclosure and composition. It was also 
headed by a widely respected accounting Professor and composed of highly 
respected academics.284 Irrespective of the above, the Enron audit committee 
failed to recognise the accounting discrepancies and bring them to the attention 
of the board.  
 
 Another study carried out in the USA, which used a sample of 692 publicly 
traded firms to determine whether management earnings were related to audit 
committee independence showed that, management earnings were more 
pronounced in firms with audit committees composed of fewer independent 
directors. On the other hand, the research also showed that there was no relation 
between management earnings and the number of outside directors on the audit 
committee.285 
 
In contrast, other studies have shown that an audit committee composed 
of majority independent directors enhances auditor independence and 
effectiveness as an independent audit committee allows for extensive exploration 
of problems.286 A study of the first top 200 publicly traded Fortune 500 firms in the 
year 2000 showed that, an independent audit committee composed of majority 
expert independent directors287 positively impacts on firm value.288 Regarding 
board independence, the results also showed that, expert independence 
directors who control fifty per cent or more of the board enhance firm value. In 
the same vein, the authors argue that, the mere presence of the expert 
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independent director on the board does not that enhance firm performance, but it 
is also the control that the directors on the board have.289 
 
4.4.3 Remuneration  
Studies on the effectiveness of the independent director in curbing executive 
remuneration also vary greatly.290 In Australia a research was carried out in which 
the top 100 companies ranked by market capitalisation listed on the Australian 
Stock Exchange, were used to ascertain levels of executive remuneration. The 
research conducted sought to ascertain whether with an insider-influenced 
remuneration committee is prone to compensate the CEO any differently to a 
company with an independent remuneration committee.291 The results of the 
study showed that, there was no evidence supporting the hypothesis that the 
relationship between corporate performance and CEO pay is stronger in 
companies with an independent remuneration committee compared to those with 
an insider-influenced remuneration committee.292 Furthermore, a Henly College 
Management research carried out on 134 listed companies in 1997-2000 also 
found, amongst other things, that no relationship existed between company 
performance and the presence of a remuneration committee.293 
 
4.4.4 CEO/Duality 
The King II recommends that, the position of the CEO and chairperson be 
separated.294 As alluded to earlier, the main purpose of the separation is to 
‘ensure a balance of power and authority, such that no one individual has 
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unfettered powers of decision-making.’295 Furthermore is helps demonstrate 
independence of the role of the Chair. 
 
Regarding the separation of the role between the CEO and the 
chairperson, some empirical evidence shows that, the separation does not result 
in improved corporate performance.296 In contrast, a study on the first top 200 
publicly traded Fortune 500 firms in the year 2000 showed that there was no 
harm when the CEO served as a regular director on the board.297 Furthermore, 
the study also showed that in companies that do not practice a dual leadership 
structure, the CEO/chairperson are less likely to support the implementation of 
policies benefiting corporate management at the expense of stakeholders. Most 
importantly, the study showed that there is a negative impact on firm value when 
CEO also chairs the board. 298 
 
It is interesting to observe that, on the one hand, Enron Corporation 
practiced CEO duality, which may have been a factor, which contributed to the 
corporation’s downfall. On the other hand, WorldCom and Global Crossing Ltd 
separated the positions of CEO and chairperson, but were still unable to control 
the corporation’s wrong doings.299 
 
4.4.5 Other factors influencing corporate performance  
Other theoretical perspectives that support the premise that the independent 
director is important in guiding a company’s performance include the agency 
theory, resource-dependence theory and the stakeholder theory. The agency 
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theory suggests that a greater proportion of independent directors are better 
suited to monitor any self-interested actions by management. In turn, the high 
levels of monitoring should lead to improved corporate performance. However, 
the link between the agency theory and firm performance remains inconclusive. 
In support of the above, a case study on profit and non-profit organisations 
carried out in Australia ‘failed to identify a positive relationship between a 
preponderance of outside directors and a reduction in agency costs.’300 
 
From a stakeholder perspective, stakeholder orientations are likely to be 
more diversified amongst outside directors relative to inside directors.’301 Wang 
and Dewhirst assert that,  
 
Independent directors have a very strong stakeholder orientation, 
and recognize that their responsibility encompasses more than 
shareholders and are very conscious about the needs and 
expectations of the various constituencies of their firms. 302 
 
Through embarking on corporate social responsibility, independent 
directors assist in creating wealth in the community in which the corporation 
operates. Furthermore, outside directors also assist in managing a firm’s various 
stakeholders.303 
 
Regarding a company’s share price, investors often see the presence of 
an independent director on company boards as an important element of good 
corporate governance, which may have the effect of raising the share price. 
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There is also strong evidence to indicate that investors are more willing to pay a 
premium for shares in a well-governed company.304 
 
From the above studies, we note that the link between the independent 
director and firm performance remains inconclusive. Many authors are yet to 
reach consensus on whether the independent director contributes to the 
performance of the company. I am of the view that determining whether the 
independent director adds value to the corporation may continue to remain a 
challenge, as there are many factors that need to be taken into account to 
ascertain their value to the corporation. For instance, the environment in which 
the director operates, the size of the company and the duration for which the 
independent director has been on the board. However, I am of the view that 
independent director may add value through monitoring the company and 
ensuring compliance. In this regard, Chambers asserts that,  
 
It is much safer ground to assert that non-executive directors add 
value in providing oversight of management with respect to the 
accountability, control and corporate governance aspects of best 
board practice.305 
 
Above all, to be more valuable to the company, the independent director 
needs to overcome the challenges he experiences while carrying out his role. 
The next section of the dissertation discusses the challenges faced by the 
independent director before looking at means of making the independent director 
more effective. 
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4.5 Challenges faced by the Independent Director 
The independent director faces numerous challenges in carrying out his role in 
corporate governance. Some of these challenges relate to the environment in 
which the independent director operates and others relate to insufficient 
corporate governance mechanisms within companies that enable the 
independent director to act independently and efficiently.306 Below is a discussion 
of some of the challenges faced by the independent director in fulfilling his role in 
corporate governance. 
 
 To begin with, some so called independent directors are not truly 
independent. At times, the independent director is often closely allied to 
management hence posing a challenge towards effective detached monitoring. 
For instance, an independent director may be a senior executive of another listed 
company, hence a fellow businessperson. As such, it is common for the director 
to socialise in the same circles or to serve as a fellow non-executive with the 
senior executives whom he is supposed to monitor.307 This close interaction may 
present a barrier towards vigorous monitoring.308 
 
Often an independent director develops close relations with executive 
directors, which is a positive thing as it usually leads to a high level of board 
cohesiveness. However, at times, high levels of cohesiveness are often 
accompanied by an absence of cognitive or task oriented disagreement. Van den 
Berghe and Baelden assert that, a high level of cohesiveness, accompanied by 
an absence of cognitive conflict can lead to groupthink.309 Forbes and Milliken 
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define groupthink as a ‘dysfunctional mode of group decision making 
characterized by a reduction in independent thinking and a relentless striving for 
unanimity among members.’310 
 
 Furthermore, another factor, which may ally the independent director to 
management, is an excessively lengthy presence on the board of directors.311 
Over time, an independent director may become accustomed to some of the 
malpractices of the board and find it difficult to challenge such practices.312 In 
addition, after a while there may be a change in qualities of the director. For 
instance, when the director was appointed, that individual possessed all the 
requisite qualities required by the company, but as time progressed, the director 
slackened and began to lose those qualities, they initially possessed. 
 
Another challenge faced by the independent director relates to monitoring 
a board that is dominated by executives who have the bad behavioural 
characteristics or inadequate qualifications for their positions. For instance, if the 
boardroom atmosphere is filled with greed, arrogance or self-interest, operating 
in such an environment may be difficult.313 Such an executive dominated board 
may make the boardroom culture or atmosphere unconducive to easy interaction 
between board members. For example, executive board dominance may be 
prevalent in companies where there is no separation between the chairperson 
and the CEO. Here, a CEO\chairperson with a domineering personality may use 
their personality to impose decisions on the board, thus hindering an opportunity 
for the independent director to contribute to board processes. 
                                            
310
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 As the independent directorship is a part time function, limited time may 
be spent on board activity, which may result in affairs not being handled in depth. 
For example, a recent research showed that Dutch non-executive directors meet 
an average of 6.4 times a year.314 Similarly in the USA non-executives ‘expressed 
that the lack of time at board meetings, as well as the little time for preparation 
imposed a limit on their contributions.’315 
 
In addition to time constraints, the independent director may lack detailed 
information on how the company is operating.316 As such, the independent 
director has to rely on the information received from the executives in order to 
perform his duties. The fundamental challenge with the independent director 
relying on information from the executives is that, executives have control over 
the information they provide to the independent director. In other words, the 
executives are in a position to manipulate information in a manner that may 
influence the independent director to act in accordance with the executives’ 
wishes.317 The above problem may also be compounded for instance on a board 
that only has one executive director, as this could stifle the flow of information to 
the board.318  
 
 It is interesting to observe that, in order to monitor the executives, the 
independent director needs to be independent and unbiased. However, in order 
to do this, the independent director needs to rely on information he receives from 
the executives. In light of the above, monitoring, advising and acting 
                                            
314
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independently becomes difficult, as the executives may have tampered with the 
information they rely on.319 
 
 In addition to the limited time the independent director has to monitor the 
company, an independent director may lack the necessary experience to do his 
work effectively. This may lead the independent director into managing the 
company more conservatively as he fears exposing his inexperience.320 Ritchie 
asserts that, ‘individuals with the most valuable experience of company business 
are those who have worked for that company for many years, or who have been 
closely involved with it on a supply or demand level.’321 Hence, ‘those people 
especially in senior management positions are intimately aware of the company’s 
position in the market, its processes and how to maximise its efficiency, where 
risks from competitors lie who are more likely to make better directors than 
individuals who begin with no experience of the company.’322 
 
 On a different note, the pool from which to choose independent directors 
is relatively small, even with the BEE requirements, which compel companies to 
employ a certain percentage of black employees in senior management and 
directorship positions. Currently, South African companies are constrained in 
their efforts to meet government-set targets as the pool from which to draw black 
skills either for directorships or other senior appointments is desperately small.323  
 
Despite the numerous challenges that the independent director faces, 
there are means of enabling the independent director to be more effective. Below 
is a discussion on ways to make the independent director more effective. 
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4.6 Improving the effectiveness of the independent director 
Firstly, for any director to be effective that director must possess three essential 
characteristics. That is to say, the director must possess an independent mind, 
the required level of competency and good behavioural characteristics. 324 
 
Good behavioural characteristics are integral towards influencing the 
effectiveness of the independent director. The reason being that, they directly 
relate to how individual directors work together to determine the manner in which 
company is managed to the interests of the shareholders.325 Good behavioural 
characteristics may include honesty, right attitude and a high moral and ethical 
integrity.   
 
Hence, it is important that companies appoint an independent director with 
good behavioural characteristics that fit within the individual behavioural 
characteristics of the existing board members.326 In other words, the independent 
director should share a similar positive character with the current board 
members. In the same vein, the behavioural characteristics of the independent 
director should also fit within the strategy of the company. For example, if a 
company wishes to increase its stakeholder relations, such a company should 
aim to hire an independent director with, 
 
Strong persuasive skills, a high degree of credibility and one who 
has the ability to work individually with a variety of people both 
inside and outside the company.327  
 
Furthermore, companies should nominate an independent director who 
‘enjoys considerable influence among their peers and provides leadership their 
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peers can clearly endorse.’328 This is particularly important in the sensitive role 
the independent director often plays in advising and negotiating with the CEO 
and the board.329 For example, an independent director who has the support of 
his peers can negotiate a remuneration package for the CEO that can easily be 
endorsed by the other board members. 
 
Once the suitable individual who possess the good behavioural 
characteristics have been appointed as an independent director, it is imperative 
that he be provided with good incentives to enable him to be truly committed to 
performing his fiduciary duties.330 Often, without appropriate incentives in place, 
few independent directors will actually invest the needed time and effort to learn 
and add value to the company.331 
 
Therefore, as an incentive, an independent director could be compensated 
primarily with company stocks, not cash, for their services. This requires the 
independent director ‘to buy a significant amount of company stocks using their 
own money at the time of joining the board as director.’332 Furthermore, the 
independent director could be required to keep a significant proportion (for 
example, 60–80%) of his stock during his entire tenure as director and during the 
first one or two years after retirement from the board.333 The above compels the 
independent director to become an owner of the company thus also providing an 
incentive for him to get involved in corporate governance of the company.334 
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Additionally, it also assists in aligning the independent director’s interests with 
those of the shareholders.335 
 
‘Due to the financial stakes involved, the independent director will also 
become more prudent in his decision to accept an invitation to join a company’s 
board.’336 Furthermore, ‘the independent director will learn more about the 
company, and will seriously think about whether or not to take the responsibility 
of being its director.’337 In acquiring the company stocks, it is also important that 
the independent director acquire a sizeable stake in the company, as this 
enables him to be motivated enough to question and challenge management 
proposals. 
 
In order question and challenge executive management proposals, it is 
also imperative that, the independent director be in possession of the right 
information. Regarding the challenge of information asymmetry, the Higgs Report 
recommends that, the company secretary play a more central role towards the 
provision of information and supporting the effective performance of the 
independent directors.338 Furthermore, the Higgs Report notes that, the 
independent director should be more responsible ‘in judging the information he 
receives and provide feedback regarding the information received.’339 In other 
words, the independent director should not hesitate to seek clarification where 
necessary regarding information received or required. The Higgs Report also 
recommends that, if the information received is not clear or appropriate this 
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should be signalled through the chairperson.340 Having accesses to the right 
information enables the independent director to be kept abreast of the company’s 
operational processes.  
 
Upon receiving the right information, the independent director needs to be 
constantly engaged in the process of enlarging his understanding and perfecting 
his skills on how to operate the company.341 To be more effective, the 
independent director should constantly know enough about the company’s 
business and industry to enable him to determine which factors are critical to the 
business performance and which are not. An independent director who 
understands the company’s business can make informed decisions on how the 
board should spend its limited time to determine better what information directors 
need when reviewing both corporate performance and strategy.342 At the same 
time, constantly keeping himself abreast of the company’s undertakings allows 
the independent director to avoid becoming stagnant on business issues. 
 
The independent director should be ready to undertake educational 
activities to enhance his understanding of the company operations, in order to be 
abreast of the company’s operations,  Educational activities that the independent 
director may undertake include, ‘a program of continuous stimulation by reading, 
in which new books or copies of interesting pamphlets are circulated to board 
members.’343 Short courses and seminars on how to be a better board member 
may also be undertaken to improve the effectiveness of the director. 
 
 In summary, for the independent director to be more effective, it is 
necessary that companies appoint directors with the right characteristics that fit 
within the company objective and strategy. The independent director also needs 
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to be given good incentives to encourage his involvement in corporate 
governance. For example, investing in the company’s stock options, as this also 
facilitates the alignment of the independent director’s interests with those of the 
shareholders. Access to the right information through the company secretary is 
also vital towards improving the effectiveness of the independent director. 
Furthermore, the ability to keep up to date with the company’s operations and 
business environment through undertaking formal education is a necessity 
towards making the independent director more effective. 
 
 Having looked at ways to make the independent director more effective, 
the next part of the dissertation does a chapter-by-chapter summary before 
laying out the conclusion.
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SUMMARY 
This dissertation sought to analyse the role of the independent director in 
maintaining good corporate governance. The analysis began with chapter one 
providing a brief overview of corporate governance. In this chapter, corporate 
governance was defined, amongst other things, as the system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.344 In the overview, the dissertation also 
highlighted the main purpose of corporate governance as to protect the external 
providers of capital (the shareholders). It was highlighted that, adequate 
protection needs to be given to the shareholders to avoid those who run the 
company from abusing their power for their own personal benefit. 
 
In the overview, the dissertation also touched on how the separation of 
ownership from control led to the agency problem. The dissertation noted that, 
due to the separation of ownership and control, executive directors are inclined to 
act in a self serving manner through only looking after their own interests’ instead 
of those of the shareholders. In an attempt to overcome the agency problem, the 
dissertation suggested the appointment of independent directors to company 
boards. The above recommendation was based on the premise that, 
independent directors on the board could help align the interests of the 
executives with those of the shareholders and thus overcome the agency 
problem. 
 
Chapter one concluded by looking at the rationale of the independent 
director in corporate governance. Some of the factors that were discussed 
include that, the independent director as a monitor assists in reducing conflicts of 
interest between the shareholders and the company management through 
bringing an independent voice to the boardroom. Above all, the underlying 
rationale of the independent director was that the independent director as an 
outsider is best suited to provide advice, monitor and protect the rights of 
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shareholders. The reason for this being that, since the independent director is not 
involved in the daily operations of the company he is able to give a detached 
view on how the company should operate in the best interests of the 
shareholders. In essence, the independent director is a better watchdog or 
monitor as compared to the executive director. 
 
The next chapter discussed the board of directors and their role in 
corporate governance. Here, the dissertation discussed the composition of the 
board in line with the various corporate governance recommendations. 
Emanating from most of the corporate codes was the need to have more 
directors that are independent on company boards. This chapter also looked at 
other corporate governance recommendations such as splitting the role of the 
chairperson and that of the CEO. The dissertation noted that, it is imperative that 
the two roles be split to avoid an over concentration of power in one person 
which may lead to one individual possessing unfettered powers of decision-
making.  
 
The dissertation also touched on the statutory role of the board, which is 
to manage the business affairs of the company and perform any acts that are 
provided for in the Memorandum of Incorporation and the companies’ 
legislation.345 Other roles that were discussed include corporate decision-making, 
management and board selection and engaging in corporate social responsibility. 
In conclusion, chapter two looked at the duties of a director under South African 
law. Here, the dissertation briefly discussed the statutory and common law duties 
of a director. Most importantly, the chapter highlighted that in carrying out their 
duties, the law requires that the director serve the interests of the company to the 
exclusion of the interests of any such nominator, employer or principal. 346 
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Chapter three introduced the concept of an independent director. This 
chapter sought to define the independent director and ascertain if the law 
distinguishes between an executive director and the independent director or non-
executive director. From the analysis, the dissertation revealed that in law there 
is no real distinction between the directors. Reference was made to the case of 
Howard v Herrigel in which the court noted that, ‘it is unhelpful and even 
misleading to classify the company directors as executives or non-executives 
(Independent Director) for the purposes of ascertaining their duties to the 
company.’347 Although no real distinction exists in law, the dissertation observed 
that a majority of corporate codes have distinct definitions for directors. To 
ascertain the above, a comparative analysis of how the various corporate codes 
define the independent director was undertaken. Emanating from most corporate 
codes was that, the independent director should be an individual who does not 
have any material ties with the company in which the directorship is held. Also 
observed was that, most codes in defining the independent director seem to omit 
soft factors such as the director’s character and attitude, which are important in 
ascertaining if the person is truly independent. 
 
The next task under chapter three was to look in depth at the role of the 
independent director in corporate governance. Here, the dissertation identified 
that the independent director has three primary roles, which are monitoring 
managerial activities, strategy development and communication and resolving 
conflicts. Of the three roles, the dissertation highlighted the monitoring role as the 
most important role of the independent director. The main reason for this being 
that, as an outside non-affiliated individual the independent director has the 
ability to analyse issues from a detached view, which in turn shows an unbiased 
perception of how the company is operating. In carrying out this monitoring role, 
the dissertation noted that, independent directors are effective as monitors when 
they ask tough questions to executives. The above essentially involves the 
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independent director possessing the willingness and ability to question 
executives over decisions they make on behalf of the company. This point was 
highlighted in light of the fact that at times independent directors are appointed to 
serve certain interests outside the board. Nonetheless, in terms of South African 
law all directors are required to act in the best interests of the company as a 
whole. 
 
In conclusion, chapter three looked at some of the external factors that 
influence and shape the role of the independent director. Some of the factors that 
were discussed include the amount of regulation within the industry and the 
presence of external stakeholders. The dissertation noted that a highly regulated 
corporate governance system might lead to over emphasis on the monitoring role 
played by independent director as the independent director tries to ensure that 
the company abides to the vast amount of regulations. Given the numerous 
regulations and the time the board meets during the year, this may pose a 
challenge towards effective monitoring. 
 
Under chapter four, the dissertation analysed the independent director in 
action. This chapter dealt with how the independent director carries out his roles 
on the various board committees. Here, the dissertation discussed the 
independent director’s roles on the audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees. Under the audit committee the dissertation highlighted the 
importance of the independent director’s monitoring role in ensuring the accurate 
reporting of financial statements and minimising management earnings. The 
dissertation also highlighted the importance of the independent director in 
curbing excessive executive remuneration. Here the dissertation noted that, the 
independent director plays a vital role through recommending remuneration in a 
detached way from the executives. Furthermore, the dissertation noted that, the 
independent director lends credibility to the committee recommendations as the 
committee recommendations are made by independent individuals. 
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The next part of chapter four looked at whether the independent director 
adds value to the company. Here, an analysis of empirical studies carried out on 
the relationship between the independent director and firm performance was 
undertaken. An analysis on the relationship between the independent director 
and accurate financial reports showed that the results varied a lot. Some studies 
showed that, an audit committee composed of majority independent directors 
enhances auditor independence and effectiveness as an independent audit 
committee allows for extensive exploration of problems.348 Other studies showed 
that, showed that the presence of independent directors on audit committees did 
not increase the reliability of financial information. Here, an example of the Enron 
audit committee was cited, which operated under the guidelines for independent 
audit committee, yet failed to observe the accounting discrepancies.  
 
Still in chapter four, an analysis on the effect of an independent 
remuneration committee in Australia showed there was no evidence supporting 
the hypothesis that the relationship between corporate performance and CEO 
pay is stronger in companies with an independent remuneration committee 
compared to those with an insider-influenced remuneration committee.349 
 
The varying results were explained in light of the numerous challenges 
that the independent director faces. The dissertation noted that, the challenges 
the independent director faces, such as the lack of independence and 
inadequate time to devote to the company, also play a part in deciding whether 
such a director adds value to the corporation. This part of chapter four observed, 
amongst other factors, that monitoring the executives may prove challenging on 
a board that is dominated by executives where there is no room for the 
independent directors to participate fully in board activities. Another challenge 
highlighted regarded the information received by the independent director. Here, 
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the dissertation noted that the independent director relies heavily on information 
from the very same people whom he is supposed to monitor. As such, there is a 
possibility that executives may manipulate the information they provide to the 
independent director in an effort to foster their own personal interests. 
 
 In spite of the challenges cited above, chapter four concluded by looking 
at means of making the independent director more effective. Here, the 
dissertation recommended that, the independent director possess three qualities 
that may assist in fulfilling their roles. The qualities that were recommended were 
an independent mind, the required level of competency and good behavioural 
characteristics. Of the three noted above, the most important quality being good 
behavioural characteristics. 
 
The dissertation also highlighted the need for good incentives to 
encourage the independent director to be more involved in the governance of the 
company. Incentives that were discussed include, providing the independent 
director with share options. In the same vein, the chapter highlighted the need for 
the independent director not to be pre occupied with maintaining a high share 
price while neglecting their obligation to create wealth for present and future 
shareholders and stakeholders. 
 
Regarding the information asymmetry, chapter four concluded by noting 
the importance of the company secretary towards providing the independent 
director with accurate information. Furthermore, the independent director is also 
tasked with questioning the veracity of the information received before acting 
upon it. In the same vein, the independent director was encouraged to undertake 
further education to sharpen his mental skills and keep up to date with the 
growing business and economic trends in society. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The underlying theme of my study was to analyse the role of the independent 
director in maintaining corporate governance. The analysis was undertaken in 
light of a number of corporate governance recommendations, which advocate for 
the independent director to take a more central role within corporate governance.  
 
The separation of ownership from control, which led to the agency 
problem, saw the introduction of the independent director as a means of 
monitoring managerial activities and ensuring that the executive management 
carries on business in the best interests of the shareholders. This dissertation 
revealed the monitoring of managerial activities as one of the most important 
functions of the independent director. In carrying out this monitoring role, the 
dissertation highlighted how important it is for the independent director to be 
probative towards the executive management regarding decisions made on 
behalf of the company. Few may argue against the fact that the objective, 
transparent monitoring of company affairs by an outsider is essential towards 
maintaining good corporate governance standards.  
 
The dissertation also revealed the importance of the monitoring role 
played by the independent director in ensuring the accurate presentation of 
financial data and curbing executive pay. Although some of the results regarding 
the effectiveness of the independent director’s monitoring role varied, there was 
some strong evidence that independent directors could minimise incidences of 
management earnings and curb executive remuneration. 
 
However, in carrying out the monitoring role, the dissertation revealed that 
the independent director does face numerous challenges that hinder the 
director’s effectiveness. For instance, challenges of information asymmetry, 
monitoring an executive dominated board and limited time designated for board 
activities. Nonetheless, this dissertation showed the value that the independent 
director brings through the monitoring role in corporate governance. 
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From this analysis, I would recommend the need for more research to be 
undertaken to ascertain more clearly the role of the independent director in 
corporate governance. This may be done through companies allowing 
researchers access to their premises to research the role and effect of the 
independent director on company boards. Emanating from the research, 
corporate codes may be used to set out clearly the role of the independent 
director. Future research may also need to be undertaken on means to overcome 
the challenges faced by the independent director as these challenges influence 
the role and effectiveness of the independent director.  
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